Further, the position of these critics was diametrically opposed to Eisenhower’s goal of achieving freedom of passage for intelligence gathering satellites in outer space as had been initially envisioned by the Surprise Attack Panel.
After Dulles’ response, the Air Force disputed that its balloons were intended for anything other than charting the jet stream.[1] The Air Force cover story stating that the balloons “were being used for weather research also made reference to the International Geophysical Year (IGY).”[2] When the Air Force later proposed to release even higher flying balloons in mid-March 1956, Eisenhower informed Gen Nathan F. Twining, Air Force chief of staff, that he (Eisenhower) “was not interested in any more balloons” and terminated any further launches.[3]
In the meantime, a more promising avenue of gathering information, the U-2, was becoming operational and would make its maiden flight five months after Eisenhower ordered an end to the balloon flights.[4] By 1956 the practices of the Air Force and others involved in the balloon “experiments” and the contemplation of an earth orbiting observation system had focused substantial attention on and begun a dialogue regarding international outer space law.
“Space-for-Peace” and the International Geophysical Year
Driven by the advent of IGY-1 July 1957-31 December 1958-and other considerations, the United States and the USSR increased their focus on their respective space programs.[5] On 15 April 1955 the USSR announced the establishment of its Special Commission for Interplanetary Communications, making reference to a globe circling satellite program.[6] In 1955 the US was completing the formulation of its first space policy, but it did so in a somewhat ambivalent manner. The United States assumed that its space program was technologically superior to the USSR’s space program. Indeed, the US was far ahead of the Soviets in miniaturizing its warhead devices (which fact was highly classified at that time); however, as discussed later, this US advantage was to become a double-edged sword.
- ↑ Charles E. Egan, “Soviet is Accused of Balloon Scare-Air Chief Says Moscow Seeks to Create 'Incident,' Espionage Charge Denied,” New York Times, 12 February 1956
- ↑ Pedlow and Welzenbach, 85. At the same time the Air Force balloon program was receiving criticism, Richard M. Bissell Jr., special assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles and the CIA official designated by Dulles to oversee the U-2 program, had also decided to use “weather research” as the cover story for the U-2 should its existence ever be made public. Killian and Land disagreed with Bissell's proposed cover story. If a U-2 were ever lost over hostile territory, they proposed that the US “not try to deny responsibility but should state that the U-2 overflights were 'to guard against surprise attack.'” Killian and Land's proposal was to be studied (but never was) and Bissell's weather research cover story remained operative and was implemented vis-à-vis Francis Gary Powers's U-2 (discussed later in chapter 5). Ibid., 89, 178-80.
- ↑ Ibid., 86. In reality, some balloons were launched to chart the jet stream. However, launching weather related balloons at the same time that intelligence-gathering balloons were launched caused the baby to be thrown out with the bath water.
- ↑ Hall, “Origins,” 21. Hall provides a complete analysis regarding the policy factors impacting the creation of intelligence-gathering satellites during the Eisenhower administration.
- ↑ IGY was “perhaps the most ambitious and at the same time the most successful cooperative enterprise ever undertaken by nations. The IGY was a scientific year when experts from 67 nations agreed to observe the earth over its whole surface, simultaneously, and with precise instruments designed to the same standards so that the changing phenomena enveloping the earth could be caught and described in their full global sense.” See Lloyd V. Berkner, “Foreword,” in J. Tuzo Wilson, IGY The Year of the New Moons (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).
Beginning in 1945, the US had already contemplated a military space program and shortly thereafter studied the feasibility of a US launched satellite. As noted above, the early consideration of a satellite program got lost in a thicket not only of interservice rivalries over custody of such a program but also in skepticism from influential civilian scientists. For a detailed description of the period from 1945 until 1955, see Bowen and Schofield references cited in note 1. - ↑ Vechernaya Moskva, “Evening Moscow:” 15 April 55, cited in Harry Schwartz, “Russians Already Striving to Set Up Space Satellite,” New York Times, 30 July 1955, 1; and “Soviet Gives No Date,” New York Times, 30 July 1955.
