ARMY 743 phalanx was in every way successfully over- come. The legion could move and manoeuvre, without breaking its order of battle, in ground where the phalanx durst not venture without the utmost risk. One or two manipuli at most would have to shorten their front to defile past an obstacle ; in a few moments the front was restored. The legion could cover the whole of its front by light troops, as they could retire, on the advance of the line, through the inter- vals. But the principal advantage was the disposition in a plurality of lines, brought into action successively, according to the require- ments of the moment. "With the phalanx, one shock had to decide. No fresh troops were in reserve to take up the fight in case of a reverse ; in fact, that case was never provided for. The legion could engage the enemy with its light troops and cavalry on the whole of his front ; could oppose to the advance of his phalanx its first line of hastati, which was not so easily beaten, as at least six of the ten manipuli had first to be broken singly ; could wear out the strength of the enemy by the advance of the hastati, and finally decide the victory by the triarii. Thus the troops and the progress of the battle remained in the hands of the general, while the phalanx, once engaged, was irretriev- ably engaged, with all its strength, and had to see the battle out. If the Roman general de- sired to break off the combat, the legionary organization permitted him to take up a posi- tion with his reserves, while the troops engaged before retired through the intervals, and took up a position in their turn. Under all circum- stances, there was always a portion of the troops in good order, for even if the triarii were repulsed, the two first lines had reformed be- hind them. When the legions of Flamininus met Philip's phalanx in the plains of Thessaly, their first attack was at once repulsed; but charge following charge, the Macedonians got tired and lost part of their compactness of for- mation ; and wherever a sign of disorder mani- fested itself, there was a Roman manipulus to attempt an inroad into the clumsy mass. At last, 20 manipuli attacking the flanks and rear of the phalanx, tactical continuity could no longer be maintained ; the deep line dissolved into a swarm of fugitives, and the battle was lost. Against cavalry, the legion formed the orlis, a sort of square with baggage in the cen- tre. On the march, when an attack was to be apprehended, it formed the legio quadrata, a sort of lengthened column with a wide front, baggage in the centre. This was of course possible in the open plain only where the line of march could go across the country. In Caesar's time the legions were mostly recruited by voluntary enlistment in Italy. After the so- cial war, the right of citizenship, and with it lia- bility for service, had been extended to all Italy. The pay was about equal to the earnings of a laborer ; recruits, therefore, were plentiful, even without having recourse to the conscription. In exceptional cases only were legions recruited in the provinces ; thus Cffisar had his fifth le- gion recruited in Roman Gaul, but afterward it received the Roman naturalization en masse. The legions were far from having the nominal strength of 4,500 men; those of Caesar were seldom much above 3,000. Levies of recruits were formed into new legions (legiones tironum), rather than mixed with the veterans in the old legions; these new legions were at first ex- cluded from battles in the ppen field, and prin- cipally used for guarding the camp. The legion was divided into ten cohorts of three manipuli each. The names of hastati, principes, and tri- arii were maintained as far as necessary to de- note the rank of officers according to the sys- tem indicated above ; as to the soldiers, these names had lost all significance. The six centu- rions of the first cohort of each legion were by right present at councils of war. The centuri- ons rose from the ranks, and seldom attained higher command ; the school for superior offi- cers was in the personal staff of the general, consisting of young men of education, who soon advanced to the rank of tribuni militum, and later on to that of legati. The armament of the soldier remained the same : pilum and sword. Besides his accoutrements, the soldier carried his personal baggage, weighing from 35 to 60 pounds. The contrivance for carrying it was so clumsy that the baggage had first to be deposited before the soldier was ready for battle. The camp utensils of the army were carried on the backs of horses and mules, of which a legion required about 500. Every le- gion had its eagle, and every cohort its colors. For light infantry, Caasar drew from his legions a certain number of men (antesignani) equally fit for light service and for close fight in line. Besides these, he had his provincial auxiliaries, Cretan archers, Balearic slingers, Gallic and Numidian contingents, and German mercena- ries. His cavalry consisted partly of Gallic, partly of German troops. The Roman velites. and cavalry had disappeared some time before. The staff of the army consisted of the legati, appointed by the senate, the lieutenants of the general, whom he employed to command de- tached corps, or portions of the order of battle. Ca3sar for the first time gave to every legion a legate as standing commander. If there were not legates enough, the quaestor, too, had to take the command of a legion. He was prop- erly the paymaster of the army and chief of the commissariat, and was assisted in this office by numerous clerks and orderlies. Attached to the staff were the tribuni militum, and the young volunteers above mentioned (contuber- nales, comites prcetorii), doing duty as adju- tants or orderly officers; but in battle they fought in line, the same as private soldiers, in the ranks of the coJiors prcetoria, consisting of the lictors, clerks, servants, guides (specula- tores), and orderlies (apparitores) of the head- quarters. The general had a sort of personal guard, consisting of veterans, who had volun- tarily reenlisted on the call of their former
