788 ARTILLERY though proportionally larger than that before used These pieces were without ornaments, and were cast solid and then bored out, which made their dimensions much more exact than the old hollow-cast cannon; the trtmmons were strengthened by rimbases, and copper vent pieces enabled the guns to be rebushed The horses were hitched in double files, which greatly facilitated the movements of the car- riages, and the draught was made easier by iron axletrees, higher limbers, and travelling trunnion holes; the allowance of horses was six to the 12-pdrs. and four to the 8 and 4-pdrs. Fixed ammunition, elevating screws, and tan- gent scales, together with bricoles and pro- longes, facilitated the service and increased the mobility of the piece. Stronger carriages were made for the lighter guns, and uniformity was established in all new constructions by requir- ing the arsenals to make every part of the car- riages, wagons, and limbers after certain fixed dimensions, so that spare parts could be taken into the field exactly corresponding to those in use. An equipment was thus obtained which could be moved and repaired with a facility hitherto unknown. Gribeauval's reforms did not stop at the materiel, the personnel of the French artillery being completely reorganized in 1765 through his efforts. Two guns were still assigned to each infantry battalion, which were served by detachments from a company of artillery attached to each brigade of four regiments. The rest of the field artillery was j organized into two or three reserves, each re- serve consisting of divisions of eight pieces, 1 to each of which was assigned a company of artil- lery. Here we have the creation of the artil- lery unit ; the company organization, afterward merged in that of the battery with its horses and drivers, being for the first time inseparably joined to its munitions and guns. Like all military reformers, Gribeauval encountered most determined opposition, the changes he proposed not being permanently adopted till 1774. His system was far superior to any other of its day, and long served as a model to that of other nations, being introduced with but slight modifications into all the European services. Thoroughly tested in the wars of the revolution, the results triumphantly vindi- cated the abilities and military genius of its originator. The French introduced horse ar- tillery in 1792, and cut down their divisions to six pieces, eight being found too unwieldy ; these divisions received the name of batteries, and were usually composed of five guns and one howitzer. In 1799 they entirely aban- doned battalion guns as impairing the mobility of the infantry, one or two batteries attached to each division taking their places. An artil- lery train or corps of drivers, composed of en- listed men, was organized Jan. 3, 1800, and distributed among the French batteries, to- gether with a proper complement of horses bought for the purpose ; they had previously depended upon civilian drivers hired with their teams by contractors, the result being that the men, horses, and harness were always in bad condition. No changes in materiel took place under the empire, with the exception of the admission of 6 and 3-pdrs. into the service on account of the immense number of captured guns of these calibres. The tactical combina- tions of the arm, however, though at first with- out any essential change, were always bril- liant ; at Marengo the two batteries of Boudet's division kept the Austrians in check until reen- forcements came up and materially assisted in gaining that brilliant victory. The use of ar- tillery in mass dates from the French camp at Boulogne in 1805, where this great tactical im- provement was conceived and taught, the first instance of its employment being at Friedland, June 14, 1807. In this battle Gen. de Senar- mont, chief of artillery of the French first corps, combined the divisional batteries into two masses, which suddenly went into action at 000 paces from the Russian left and gradually advanced to within 300 paces, firing with the utmost rapidity; seeing the formidable effect produced, he united both masses into one grand battery of 36 pieces at 150 paces from the ene- my, who began to waver under the terrible fire of canister. Upon the Russian cavalry's attempting to charge the grand battery, the general of artillery ordered it to change front and drove them off; the French infantry then advanced and overthrew the enemy. The artil- lery lost 1 officer, 10 men, and 53 horses killed ; 3 officers and 42 men wounded ; rounds ex- pended, 2,516, of which 362 were canister. The ground was level and very favorable to ar- tillery fire. The battle of Wagram, July 5-6, 1809, presents another prominent example of the use of artillery masses. Sixty French pieces under Gen. Lauriston, supported by infantry and cavalry, advanced in two columns without open- ing fire up to canister range of the Austrian cen- tre ; only 45 pieces got into position, the others being dismounted by the fire of the enemy's artillery, but these were gradually reenforced by 45 more. The fire of this immense battery, which lasted half an hour, though inflicting great losses, failed to break the Austrians, who repulsed an attack of the French infantry and cavalry ; they were however compelled to fall back on account of the turning of their left before the French could reform for a second at- tack. At Borodino, or on the Moskva, Sept. 7, 1812, and at Lutzen, May 2, 1813, the French successfully employed artillery masses for -de- fensive purposes. At the former battle Gen. Sorbier, chief of the French artillery, by uniting 80 pieces, brought the Russians to a stand and finally forced them to retire ; at the latter, a battery of 60 guns checked the movement of the allies against the French centre. Further instances of the employment of artillery masses are found in the battles of Ocafla, 1809 ; Gross- Beeren, 1813; Bautzen, 1813; Hanau, 1813; and Brienne, 1814. The English artillery about the beginning of the French revolution
