256 CHANCELLORSVILLE thought safe. Skirmishers pushed into the woods informed Lee that the Union front was unassailable ; but a cavalry reconnoissance dis- closed the exposed situation of the Union right, and during the night Lee and Jackson resolved to attack there. To do this the confederate force must be divided. Jackson with 30,000 men was to move by a forest road around the Union position, while Lee with 20,000 kept up a show in front. Jackson moved at daybreak ; a mile of dense forest shut him from the view of the enemy ; only about 9 o'clock the road crossed a bare hill, over which the long col- umn was plainly seen moving. It was clearly a movement in force, but its object was uncer- tain. The road just there ran southward, the direction which a retreat would probably take ; but it might be for offence upon the right, and Howard was ordered to be on the alert, and especially to throw out pickets in his front. At 3 o'clock Jackson had accomplished his circuit of 15 m., which brought him within 6 m. of the point from which he had set out. He halted to form his men in an open space 2 m. to the west of Howard's position. Scouts creeping through the woods discovered the Union intrenchments unguarded ; the arms were stacked, the men preparing their dinner. At 5 o'clock Jackson burst upon them down the road and through the woods on each side. The regiments on whom the shock first fell scat- tered without firing a shot, and the whole corps broke in disorder, and swarmed down the road to within half a mile of Chancellorsville. But the pursuers were checked from two quarters. All day Lee kept up a noisy demonstration on Hooker's front. Pleasonton, with two regi- ments of cavalry and a horse battery, had pushed a little into the woods, and finding nothing for cavalry to do was riding leisurely back. He came upon an open space, now filled with men, ambulances, and guns, the debris of a part of Howard's corps. The low under- wood was swarming with the enemy. He or- dered one regiment to charge into the woods to check the pursuit for a few minutes, while with the other he brought up his horse bat- tery, got a score of other guns into position, and had all of them double-shotted with can- ister and pointed low. The check given by the cavalry to the confederates was but momen- tary; they dashed straight toward the guns, but their line was swept back by the artillery ; again and again they pressed on, and were again repelled, and at last fell back into the cover of the forest. As the Union line had been placed, Hooker had at Chancellorsville only Berry's division of Sickles's corps and a brigade of Couch's. With Berry's division he vainly tried to check the fugitives, some of whom were phot down by his staff. Berry's division then pressed straight through the fly- ing crowd, and poured a fire of artillery up the road and into the woods. This brought the pursuers to a stand. Jacksor, with a small escort, had ridden out to reconnoitre. Turn- ing back, he was fired upon by his own men, who mistook the company for enemies. He received several wounds, from which he died a week later. Hill, the next in rank, was also wounded soon after, and the command devolved upon Stuart. In this action Hooker had suffered nothing beyond the partial disor- ganization of Howard's corps, the weakest in the army ; the ground lost was of no conse- quence ; and moreover Reynolds's large corps arrived during the night from Fredericksburg. On Sunday morning, May 3, Hooker still stood on the defensive; he indeed ordered a new line to be drawn up, to which he might fall back in case of need. Lee had in the mean time communicated with Stuart, and given or- ders that "those people should be pressed." Hooker now had at and about Chancellorsville fully 78,000 effective men; Lee proposed to press him in his intrenchments with barely 50,000. The Union force was all together ; the confederates were separated by six miles of al- most pathless forest, and it depended upon the chances of battle whether these could be re- united. Moreover, Sedgwick, who had with him 27,000, might fairly be expected to be able to drive off the 10,000 of Early, and appear on the field, as he was now ordered to do. Then, could both commanders concentrate their whole force, Hooker would have 95,000, Lee at most 60,000. Hooker's line now formed three sides of an irregular square. The left, facing eastward, was held by Hancock's divi- sion of Couch's corps ; the centre by Slocum ; the right, facing westward, by Sickles and French's division of Couch's corps. Reynolds was halted two miles in the rear of the ex- treme right ; Meade was partly in reserve, and partly guarding the road leading to the river ; Howard was on the extreme left, where no at- tack was anticipated. These last three corps took no part in the action of the day. Sickles's extreme left had been at Hazle Grove, appa- rently pushed beyond the general line, and exposed to attack. Hooker directed him to withdraw from that position, which was im- mediately seized by Stuart, who planted there a battery of 80 guns. This was the most important point on the field, for the artil- lery there commanded Chancellorsville and completely enfiladed the whole Union cen- tre. As the morning fog lifted, Stuart moved to attack Sickles ; the attack was hotly made and fiercely repelled. At length Sickles's am- munition fell short, and he asked for support. His demand came at an unpropitious moment. Hooker had been leaning against a pillar at Chancellorsville ; a half-spent shot from Hazle Grove struck this, and Hooker fell insensible from the concussion. There was no one to send support to Sickles, though the two corps of Reynolds and Meade, together outnum- bering Stuart's whole force, were wholly dis- engaged. Half of either of these would have been enough to insure victory; for, Stuart's attack repelled, the remainder of Hooker's
