COMMON LAW 151 history. A multitude of statutes were passed, at various periods, declaratory of the common law, or in aid of what was claimed as constitu- tional rights, the most important of which were the Magna Charta of King John, confirmed by Henry III. ; the petition of right, passed in the reign of Charles I. ; the habeas corpus act, in that of Charles II. ; the bill of rights, in that of William and Mary; and the act of settlement under William III. Three subjects remain to be considered, viz.: chancery, ad- miralty, and the modern commercial law. As to the equity law as administered in the court of chancery, see CHANCERY. The courts of admiralty have jurisdiction of maritime causes, which were considered to be out of the reach of the ordinary courts of justice. It was a peculiarity of the common law that every ac- tion was considered local, and was triable in a particular county. Hence causes of action which arose at sea, or in foreign ports, whether upon contracts or for injuries, could have no venue in any county in England. The objec- tion in cases of contracts or injuries in foreign places has been obviated in later times by a fic- tion which represents the transaction to have taken place in an English county, and the com- mon law courts have taken jurisdiction of that class of cases, with the exception only of what are purely maritime in their nature, which have been left exclusively to the admiralty. The pro- ceedings in these courts are analogous to those of the civil law, yet not directly or entirely de- rived therefrom. The maritime laws of other countries are referred to, as well in respect to rules of decision as to the mode of proceeding, yet not as binding authority ; for the law of Eng- land recognizes no foreign law as such. Com- mon usage limited by divers acts of parliament has, however, admitted to a certain extent the principles contained in maritime codes, espe- cially the Khodian laws and laws of Oleron. The modern English commercial law has grown up chiefly within the last 200 years, and has at- tained its present complete state by the mere development of principles recognized by the common law. It is a memorable instance of the expansive power of law from natural re- sources. Statutes have had but little to do with it. The civil law, and the modern codes or systems founded thereon, have been no other- wise availed of by English judges than to aid their own reasoning. Lord Mansfield and other eminent judges were familiar with foreign ju- risprudence, but they were able to decide com- mercial questions by a process of reasoning en- tirely congenial with the common law. The second inquiry which was proposed at the be- ginning of this article was a summary of the peculiar principles by which the common law is distinguishable from other systems of law. 1. Security for life, liberty, and property. We have already referred to the declaratory stat- utes by which personal rights are guaranteed. But it would be a mistake to suppose that these statutory provisions have constituted the real defence of English liberty. They are in fact but the expression of the stern, indomitable spirit of independence which has been the honorable distinction of the national character, and without which no charter or statutes could have availed anything against arbitrary power. The statutes themselves at an early period were in fact too general in their terms to have fur- nished any sure protection against corrupt ju- dicial construction by subservient courts, had it not been for the constantly renewed exhibi- tion of persistent public, feeling which could not be safely trifled with. The famous clause in the Magna Charta, which has been often called the foundation of civil freedom in Eng- land, was in these words : Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur, aut disseisiatur de libero tenemento suo, vel libertatibus tel liberis consuetudinibus suis, aut utlagetur aut exulet, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nee super eum ibimus nee super eum mittemus, nisi per legate judicium parium tsuorum vel per legem terras. Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus. aut differe- mus rectum vel justitiam. (No free man shall be arrested, or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, or disfranchised of his liberties or customary rights, nor be outlawed or expelled from the country, or in any other manner de- stroyed, except by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell justice to no one, nor deny it to any, nor delay its due administration.) These are energetic expres- sions, yet of what avail would they have been against a tyrannical Henry VIII., who would have held, as he did in some instances, that his own will was the law of the land, or a faith- less Charles I., who could assent to the petition of right and evade its effect by falsifying the record, if the liberties of the commoners had depended upon a mere charter ? Some of the later statutes are more specific in their provi- sions. The petition of right required the cause of arrest to be specified in the warrant under which any man was imprisoned. The habeas corpus act further provided for a determination of the sufficiency of the cause of arrest, and a discharge if such arrest should be found to be illegal. Other acts provided against the exaction of bail for an excessive amount, in cases where the arrest was lawful. It is to be remembered that all these and many similar statutes purported only to guard against en- croachments upon rights claimed to exist by common law. It has always been customary in the United States to incorporate in the con- stitutions of the several states, or to declare by statutes, some of the most important of the personal rights which have been the subject of controversy in England. There is, however, but little occasion for such reenactment. The privileges thus declared are inherent in the very structure of our society, and recognized by our common legislation. Our danger does not lie in that direction, but rather in too un- checked license. The Athenian state would, perhaps, furnish us a more apt precedent of
