latter is necessarily a confederated representative democracy. Representation, therefore, lies at the root of the entire American system.
Conflicting opinions exist on the subject of the relations between the representative and his constituent, impracticable notions and contradictory errors being equally maintained. These notions may be divided into those of two schools, equally ultra, one taking its rise in the sophisms and mystifications of English politics, the other arising from the disposition of men to obtain their objects, by flattering popular power. The subject is grave, and all important to a country like this.
With the exception of a few popular boroughs, and a county or two, England has no free representation. In most of the counties, even, the control of the elections is in the hands of the great land-holders; in far the larger number of the boroughs, the power of the landlords is so great, that they name the successful candidate, as openly as the minister himself names to official employments. In the case of contested elections, even, the struggle is really between the power of two or more great families, and not between bodies of the electors, seats for boroughs being bought and sold like any other commodity. Under such circumstances, it is quite apparent that instructions from a constituency, that is itself instructed whom to return, would be a useless mockery. We are not to look at England, therefore, for principles on this subject, the fundamental systems of the two countries being so dissimilar; one giving power to property, the other to numbers.
There is no doubt it is the intention of the American system, that the will of the constitutional majorities, to a certain extent, should be properly regarded by the representative; and that when the latter, who has
