difference now, as it made no difference then, in the consideration of the consequences; yet the consequences were, none the less, rather serious. They were such, in fact, as to increase very greatly the confusion on the border and to give the Confederates that chance of recovery which soon made it necessary for their foes to do the work of Nathaniel Lyon all over again.
It has been most truthfully said[1] that never, throughout the period of the entire war, did the southern government fully realize the surpassingly great importance of its Trans-Mississippi District; notwithstanding that when that district was originally organized,[2] in January, 1862, some faint idea of what it might, peradventure, accomplish did seem to penetrate,[3] although ever so vaguely, the minds of those then in authority. It was organized under pressure from the West as was natural, and under circumstances to which meagre and tentative reference has already been made in the first volume of this work.[4] In the main, the circumstances were such as developed out of the persistent refusal of General McCulloch to coöperate with General Price.
There was much to be said in justification of McCulloch's obstinacy. To understand this it is well to recall that, under the plan, lying back of this first
- ↑ Official Records, vol. liii, supplement, 781–782; Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 105.
- ↑ — Ibid., vol. viii, 734.
- ↑ It is doubtful if even this ought to be conceded in view of the fact that President Davis later admitted that Van Dorn entered upon the Pea Ridge campaign for the sole purpose of effecting "a diversion in behalf of General Johnston" [Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. ii, 51]. Moreover, Van Dorn had scarcely been assigned to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District before Beauregard was devising plans for bringing him east again [Greene, The Mississippi, 11; Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, vol. i, 240–244].
- ↑ Abel, American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 225–226 and footnote 522.
