CaA.P. VIII. AUTHORITY IN THE FAMILY. 121 Even in this state the son remained subject to the paternal authority, which proves lliat he was not con- sidered to have left the family. We may suppose that this sale had no other eflfect than to cede the possession of the son for a time by a sort of contract to hire. Later it was employed only as an indirect means of emancipating the son. III. Plutarch informs us that at Rome women could not appear in court even as witnesses.* We read in the jurisconsult Gains, " It should be known that noth- ing can be granted in the way of justice to persons under power — that is to say, to wives, sons, and slaves. For it is reasonably concluded that, since these persons can own no property, neither can they reclaim anything in point of justice. If a son, sub- ject to his father's will, has committed a crime, the action lies against the father; nor has the father him- self any action against his son."^ From all this it is clear that the wife and the son could not be plaintiffs or defendants, or accusers, or accused, or witnesses. Of all the family the father alone could appear before the tribunal of the city ; public justice existed only for him ; and he alone was responsible for the crimes committed by his family. Justice for wife and son wiis not in the city, because it was in tiie house. The chief of the family was their judge, placed upon a judgment seat in virtue of his marital and parental authority, in the name of the fam- ily and under the eyes of the domestic divinities.^ ' Plutarch, PubUcola, 8. * Gaius, II. 96 ; IV. 77, 78. ^ There came a time when this jurisdiction was modified; the father consulted the whole family, and formed it into a tribunal, over whicii ho presided. Tacit., XIII, 32. Digest, XXIII. tit. 4. 6. Plato, Laws, IX.
