thought after the passing away of Hamilton, Wilson, and Chalmers. The preparations of this series occupied him a good deal for some years, though its publication dates 1855-8.
Besides preparing and overlooking these volumes he was busily engaged in maturing a scheme of philosophy, which should shake the to its foundations the carefully up built metaphysics of Scotland by proving that the common dicta of consciousness are to be repudiated as false instead of being accepted as the source and first principles of all true mental science; and to take a new departure for philosophy and not only lay the foundations but build up the the column of an unwreckable lighthouse in the sea of speculation. Having given earnest and vigorous toil of thought to the execution of this great test textbook and evidence of metaphysical genius, he believed that he had achieved his end, and had it in his power to prove that he could do something for the fame of Scotland, the progress of truth, and the assertion of an individual right to the notice of his countrymen.
In 1854 the results of his long outwearing meditations were given to the public. They constitute—whatever opinion of the accuracy or adequacy of the system may be formed—one of the most remarkable productions in philosophical literature, a work, as one critic calls it, "without parallel modern speculation," one in which the author attempts to prove, by a series of demonstrations successively following from each other by a necessity as astringent as the propositions of Euclid, that nothing can be known, or exist, dissevered from the self or Ego, or percipient mind." "This is," says another, "no ordinary book. if we mistake not, its publication will mark an epoch in the history of speculation in this country. The author is familiar with what has been done in this field by ancients and moderns; and his acuteness and independence of thinking are as conspicuous as his learning."
The "Institutes of Metaphysic" consist of an Introduction, in which the object and method of worker explained and illustrated, and of three sections, in which the necessary truths or laws of all reason are laid down in a series of distinct propositions; and facing each of these propositions is laid down, in a counter-proposition, the contradictory inadvertency of ordinary opinion, so that we can always play them off against each other, and know exactly what we are dealing with, what we are contending for, and what we are contending against; enhance "proposition and counter-proposition are the two hinges of the system. Of the contents of this able and singular work we can offer only the scantiest summary.
Introduction.—"A system of philosophy" "ought to be true, and it ought to be reasoned." "Philosophy, therefore, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth. It is more proper that the philosophy should be reasoned than it should be true; because well truth may be, perhaps, unattainable by man, to reason is certainly his province and within his power. "A system is of the highest value when it is both reasoned and
