words which are unjustified by prop. 1, unless in the sense of "a cognition of self is an integral and essential part of every process of cognition." Cognition of self must be either—1, prior to; 2, simultaneous with; or, 3, consequent upon "any intelligence" knowing. Professor Ferrier elects for necessary simultaneity, hence—1, self cannot be the condition of knowledge; 2, knowledge cannot be the condition of self, and they must therefore be, 3, con-causes (or mutually active conditions, producing a compound effect. These concurrent causes in producing this effect must either be—1, one subordinate to the another; 2, co-equal; or, 3, concomitantly variable. It is impossible (by prop. 1) to exclude or isolate either; we can hinder neither from being present, nor can we contrive that either should be present alone. We find rather "that consciousness on the one hand, and all our natural modifications on the other, exist in an inverse ratio to one another; that whenever the natural modification is plus the consciousness of it is minus and vice versâ.[1]
Now, regarding concomitant variations, the canon of logic[2] is that "whatever phenomenon varies in any manner, wherever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon—or is connected with it through some fact of causation." Every interference found on such concomitancy is exposed to uncertainty from "the possibility that beyond the limits [of our observation], and in circumstances therefore of which we have no direct observation, some counteracting cause might develop itself; either a new agent, or a new property of the agents concerned; which lies dormant in the circumstances we are able to observe. Hence we cannot with coherent logic, in these circumstances, reason with necessary certainty from what we observe in our intelligence that which must be of "any intelligence," "the ground or condition of its knowledge." Of self, therefore we cannot say, "Its apprehension is essential to the existence of our, and of all knowledge." ("Institutes page 75.) This polemic, we believe, when fairly and fully thought out would invalidate the universality and necessity of the foundation propositions of the Institutes, and show that the cognition of self is implicitly contained in each process, it does not form an integral and essential part of every object of cognition.
Space fails: and we must adjourn the consideration of this question and further details of Ferrier's life and works till another opportunity arises.
