Page:The Channel Tunnel, Ought the Democracy to Oppose Or Support It?.djvu/23

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THE CHANNEL TUNNEL.

to render it impossible for the defenders of those works to have recourse to any of the means which would be in existence for the purpose of closing or destroying tho tunnel, or, that the whole of those means should simultaneously chance to be out of working order.

"That every one of these conditions should be present at the same time appears to us most improbable. We can well conceive that, with the rapid communications now available for the movement of troops by land or sea, a force such as that contemplated might be collected and despatched, and possibly reach our coasts without warning. That its landing, formation, and forward movement could altogether escape detection we can scarcely conceive. It would, we learn from Admiral Rice, take twelve hours, even under the most favorable conditions, and assuming the landing to be unresisted, to land 20,000 men, the force contemplated by Sir Lintorn Simmons. Such a force could not, however, in Admiral Rice's opinion, be landed without attracting attention. A smaller body could, of course, be landed with greater rapidity, but the diminution of its numbers would not increase its chance of success. A force of 1,000 men could, Sir Cooper Key informs us, be landed under favorable circumstances in an hour; 'the larger the number of men,' however, this witness adds, 'the more the difficulties that would arise against the time, but I have no hesitation in saying, that if they were equipped for it, with boats properly prepared, and a good clear beach, they could land 10,000 men under ten hours.' That such a force, or one approaching to it in strength, should be able to traverse without detection or hindrance, the distance intervening between the point of landing and the exit of the tunnel, which, unless the recommendations