superior is more to be reverenced, one whom every subject is more bound to obey; and the enjoined act also is more useful. But the act enjoined by the prelate, namely to feed sows on the Lord’s day, is in respect to merit a thing indifferent, but the act enjoined by God has of and in itself the reason of merit.
Hence, I could wish that he might reply to St. Bernard in respect to this case. If St. Benedict had bid him feed sows for himself and, for the same time, God had given him a counsel to give advice to persons asking in the church with respect to the salvation of their souls, I am of the opinion that the authority of him who counsels and the greater usefulness of the counsel, as compared with the commands of St. Benedict, would have forced Bernard to hearken rather to the divine counsel than to Benedict's command, both to the honor of God and to the salvation of those asking counsel. From this it is seen to follow, that we owe more to any divine counsel whatever than to a human command which is incompatible with it. Secondly, it is seen to follow that no one is bound to obey a private command except in so far as it admonishes in accordance with the divine counsel or command; and it is clear that, as regards the mode, a due measure of reason is involved and also the quality of the command, both of which he who is called upon to obey and he who commands ought to consider. For what reason would there be for the command of a dull and fat bishop that a priest should feed sows and send away Christ's sheep without pasturing them—sheep which Christ purchased with his own blood?
Similarly must the circumstance of place be thought of, for, if a prelate should bid a subject to appear in a place where enemies are who are planning the subject's death, the subject is not bound to obey. Hence Pope Clement V, de Sent. et rejud. in Clement. [Friedberg, 2: 1152], says: "Who would dare or by what reason would any one be held bound
