sary education, and a considerable stake in the welfare of the State. But Solon's great stroke was the elevation of the lowest class, not indeed to the executive itself, but to a position in the constitution whence it could, as it were, survey and control that executive. They were to share in the elections of the magistrates, and all over thirty years of age were to have the right of sitting in an assembly which should judge of the conduct of the magistrates after their year of office was over. If these constitutional changes were maintained, no magistrate, whatever his birth or wealth, could ever with impunity use his power to trample on the rights of the poorest Athenian. It is possible that he also guaranteed to the whole people in their ancient assembly (ἐκκλησία) the right, which must have in theory been theirs always, of deciding on questions of war and peace.[1]
These changes did not constitute Democracy, — a form of government then unknown, and for which there was as yet no word in the Greek language. But they initiated the democratic spirit, and were indeed changes vital enough to alarm men who did not know the reasonableness of the Athenian people and its lawgiver. As if aware that he was bringing into political prominence a new stratum of
- ↑ Busolt, Gr. Gesch. i. 536, note 1. For Solon's constitution, read Plut. Solon, 18 foll.; Solon, fragment 5; Aristotle, Pol. ii. 12; Ath. Pol. 7. Cf. Busolt and Gilbert, ll.cc. The reader, perhaps, needs to be reminded that in any independent study of Solon's work, he must weigh the value of the ancient authorities both in regard to their intrinsic excellence and to the sources to which they may be traced.
