ercise judgment on them after their time of office; but in such a democracy the actual government will be left to those whose wealth, position, virtue, and renown, make them competent to discharge such duties.[1] At Rome, at the period we have reached, these conditions of a moderate democracy were present; the population was mainly agricultural, and came into the city only to vote in elections, or now and then to decide questions legislative and judicial. The government was left to those who were capable of it; the Roman people itself tilled the ground and served in the army, but did not govern; it was sovereign, but it did not rule. Such a constitution was admirably suited to the Roman State and character, which was as different from the Athenian as an English labourer is from an Irishman. But Rome was already started on a career which was to bring her under conditions of political life unknown in Aristotle's philosophy; and how would her constitution fit itself to these? Was it to go forward in what might seem its natural course, towards a complete democracy like the Athenian? Or was the character of this δῆμος γεωργικός unsuited for the detailed work of self-government, for the organisation of conquests already won, and for the conduct of long struggles against enemies which were at this very time beginning to threaten?
Instead of pursuing the course of Roman history step by step, let us at once look forward a century and a half, and, taking a fresh stand about the year 150 B.C., let us take note of the constitution as we
- ↑ This is the general sense of Pol. (1318 B).
