celebrates the condition of the Good in the next life. It is a state where the righteous are rewarded and the wicked punished until sin is consumed from their nature, when they come to the divine abode.[1]
To pass from the Poets to the Philosophers; the Immortality of the Soul was taught continually, from Pherecydes to Plotinus. There were those who doubted, and some that denied; yet it was defended by all the greatest philosophers, Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Epictetus,[2] and by the most in-
- ↑ Olymp. II. vs. 104, et seq. (57–92, in Dissen.) See Cowley's wild imitation in his Pindarique Odes, Lond. 1720, Vol. II. p. 160, et seq. See similar thoughts in Propertius, Lib. III. 39, et seq.; and Tibullus, Eleg. III 58; Virgil. Æneid, VI. See also Pindar's Fragment, II. Vol. III. p. 34, ed. Heyne, Lips. 1817, Frag. I. p. 31, et seq., Frag. III. p. 36; and the notes of Dissen, in his edition of Pindar, Vol. II. p. 648, et seq., and Lobeck, ubi sup. See, who will, a treatise in the Acta Eruditorum for August, 1722, de Statu Animæ separatæ post mortem, &c.
- ↑
Cicero, Tusc. Lib. I. Chap. xvi., says Pherecydes was the first who taught
this doctrine. See the note in Lemaire's edition. See also Diogenes Laert.
Thales, Lib. I. § 43, p. 27, et seq., and Plutarch, De Placitis Phil., Lib. IV. Ch.
ii.-vii., Opp. Vol. II. p. 898, et seq. It has been thought doubtful that
Aristotle believed in immortality, and perhaps it is not easy to prove this point. See
De Anima, III. 5; but compare Ethic. Nicom. Lib. III. Chap. vi., which
denies it. See again De Anima, II. 2; De Gen. Anim. III. 4. Plato teaches
immortality with the greatest clearness. See the Phædo, passim; Georgias, p.
524, et seq. et al.; Apolog. Laws, (if they are genuine,) Lib. X. XII.;
Epinomis, Timæus, Rep. X. p. 612, et seq. Plato makes the essence of man spiritual;
Tim. p. 69, C. et seq., 72, D. et seq., Rep. IV. p. 431, A. He was
opposed to the Materialists, Soph p. 246, A. However, he did not condemn
the body. His argument in favour of immortality, like many later arguments
on the same theme, creates more questions than it answers. The form of the
doctrine, its connection with preëxistence and transmigration, like many doctrines
still popularly connected with it, serve only to disfigure the doctrine itself, and
bring it into reproach. The opinion of Cicero is so well known, that it is
almost superfluous to cite passages; but see Frag. de Consolat. 12, et seq., 27,
et al.; De Senectute, Chap. XXI., et seq., Tusc. I. C. 16; De Amicit., Ch. 3, 4;
Somnium Scipionis, et al. See Seneca, De Ira, I. 3; Consolatio ad Helv., Chap.
VI.; De Vita Beata, Chap. XXII. Ep. 50, 102, 117. Sometimes he speaks
decidedly, at other times with doubt. See Lipsius Physiol. Stoic. Lib. III.
Diss. viii.-xix. See Locke, Essay, Book ÎV. Chap. iii., and Letters to
Bishop of Worcester.
See Plutarch, De Sera Numinis Vindicta, Morals, Lond. 1691, Vol. IV. p. 197, et seq. See too the Story of Soleus the Thespesian, ibid. p. 206, et seq.; Plut. Vit. Quint. Sertorius, Opp. I. 571, 572, F. & B., for an account of the
immortality of the soul, Simonides, Frag. XXX. (XXXIII.); Tyrtaeus III. in Gaisford, Vol. III. p. 160, 242. See the curious passage in Aristophanes, Ranae, vs. 449-460, Opp. ed. Bekker, Lond. 1829, Vol. I. p. 535, in which see B.'s note. See Orpheus, as cited by Lobeck, Aglaoph., p. 950; Cudworth, Chap. I. § 21, 22, and Mosheim in loc. See the indifferent book of Priestley, Heathen Philosophy, Part I. § 3, 5; Part II. § 3, 5; also p. 125, et seq., 197, et seq., 265, et seq.
