Page:The Collected Works of Theodore Parker Discourse volume 1.djvu/53

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THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT.

manifests itself in our consciousness by a feeling of need, of want; in one word, by a sense of dependence.[1] This primitive feeling does not itself disclose the character, and still less the nature and essence, of the Object on which it depends; no more than the senses disclose the nature of their objects; no more than the eye or ear discovers the essence of light or sound. Like them, it acts spontaneously and unconsciously, soon as the outward occasion offers, with no effort of will, forethought, or making up the mind.


Thus, then, it appears that induction from notorious facts, consciousness spontaneously active, and a philosophical analysis of our nature, all lead equally to some religious element or principle as an essential part of Man's constitution. Now, when it is stated thus nakedly and abstractedly that Man has in his nature a permanent religious element, it is not easy to see on what grounds this primary faculty can be denied by any thinking man, who will notice the religious phenomena in history, trust his own consciousness, or examine and analyze the combined elements of his own being. It is true, men do not often say to themselves, “Go to now. Lo, I have a religious element in the bottom of my heart.” But neither do they often say, “Behold, I have hands and feet, and am the same being that I was last night or forty years ago.” In a natural and healthy state of mind, men rarely speak or think of what is felt unconsciously to be most true, and the basis of all spiritual action. It is, indeed, most abundantly established, that there is a religious element in Man.

  1. The religious and moral elements mutually involve each other in practice; neither can attain a perfect development without the other; but they are yet as distinct from one another as the faculties of sight and hearing, or memory and imagination. Perhaps all will not agree with that analysis which makes a sense of dependence the ultimate fact of consciousness in the case. This is the statement of Schleiermacher, not to mention more ancient authorities. See his Christliche Glaube nach der Grundsatzen der ev. Kirche, B. I. § 4, p. 15, et seq. in his Works, 1 Abt. B. III., Berlin, 1835. Of course a sense of infinite as well as finite dependence is intended. Others may call it a consciousness of the Infinite; I contend more for the fact of a religious element in man than for the above analysis of that element. This theory has been assailed by several philosophers, amongst others by Hegel. See his Philosophie der Religion, 2nd improved edition, B. I. p. 87, et seq., in B. XI. of his Works, Berlin, 1840, B. XVII. p. 279, et seq.; Rosenkrantz, Leben Hegels, Berlin, 1844, p. 341, et seq. See also Bretschneider, Handbuch der Dogmatik, Leip. 1838, Vol I., §, 12, 6. See Studien und Kritiken, für Oct. 1846, p. 845, et seq. for a defence of the opinion of Schleiermacher.