The Duke of Wellington has since taught us, on more than one occasion, that there are some extraordinary workmen who can do good work with any tools, and who can even make their own tools as they require them.—But in England, in 1801, the military workmen in court employ were all so execrably bad, that it mattered little what was the quality of the tools supplied to them. The Duke of York, David Dundas, and Lord Chatham had everything their own way: the most important posts, the most costly expeditions, were intrusted, not to the officers most formidable to the enemy, but to the friends and protégés of the military courtiers who stood best at Windsor and St. James's. It is no small proof of Cornwallis's tact in judging of men, that whilst we find him deprecating the employment in independent commands of such generals as the Dukes of Gloucester and Cumberland, Dundas, Burrard (of Cintra), Coote (of Ostend), Pulteney (of Ferrol), Whitelock (of Buenos Ayres), and Lord Chatham (of Walcheren), he had always a word of approval for Lake and Abercromby, and in an introductory letter to Sir John Shore, speaks of the lieutenant-colonel of his own regiment, the Hon. Arthur Wesley, as a "sensible man and a good officer."
Throughout the whole of The Cornwallis Correspondence, there is no single hint of stinted means for the defence of the country, there is no single doubt cast upon the personal bravery of our officers and our men; but there are many out-spoken complaints of utter incompetence and reckless extravagance on the part of those who had the chief conduct of our military affairs. From 1795 to 1805—that time of fear—we have now incontrovertible testimony that both England and Ireland were in an indefensible condition, had an invader landed with a very moderate body of such soldiers as Humbert led; and that that condition was owing in no degree to any want of manliness or liberality on the part of the British nation, but solely and entirely to the want of capacity of the men whom it pleased the court, in spite of repeated disgrace and defeat, perversely to maintain in the management and command of the army.[1]
Mr. Pitt survived Lord Cornwallis but a few months, dying early in 1806, and Lord Grenville, when invited by George III. to succeed him, positively declined to do so, unless the army was placed under ministerial control. To this innovation the poor crazy king demurred. It had been an amusement and an occupation to him in his lucid intervals, "to transact military business with Frederick," with what deplorable results to the resources and credit of the nation we now know.[2] His Majesty objected,
- ↑ "The staff in Kent seems to be calculated solely for the purpose of placing the defence of the country in the hands of Sir D. Dundas. However he may succeed with other people, I think he cannot persuade Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville that he is a clever fellow; and surely they must have too much sense to believe that it is possible that a man without talents, and who can neither write nor talk intelligibly, can be a good general."—Lord C. to Lt.-Gen. Ross.
- ↑ "April 12, 1800. The king much improved. Saw the Duke of York for two hours yesterday, on military matters. "April 13. The king not so well. Over-excited himself yesterday."—Diary of the Right Hon. Sir George Rose.
