recognition, there should certainly have been no vacillation—no disposition shown to surrender in any shape or on any terms the right which had been conceded. We could not plead want of experience, for we had abundant evidence of the determination of the Chinese to repudiate and deny every concession, the enjoyment of which was either rediscussed or deferred. We should have avoided, above all things, the transfer of the Canton question to Peking. Our right to enter Canton was incontestable. Shufflings and subterfuges on the part of the Chinese, hesitation and an erroneous estimate of the importance of the question on the part of the British Government and the British functionaries in China, led to one delay after another, and ended by an absolute denial of our treaty right, and an arming of the Chinese population to enforce that denial, accompanied at the same time by a Chinese proclamation mendaciously averring that we had withdrawn our claims. A similar course has been pursued at Peking. The Chinese, who have no notion—what Oriental has?—of privileges possessed and not exercised, saw in the willingness to give way to their representations, not, as we might have supposed, a consideration for their repugnancy, and a magnanimity in refraining from the enjoyment of a privilege distasteful to them, but an infirmity of purpose—a confession that we had asked for something we did not want, and which they felt to be a degradation needlessly and gratuitously imposed upon them. There is, in fact, neither safety nor dignity in any course but the stern, steady persistence in the assertion and enforcement of whatever conditions are the subject of imperial engagements.
Lord Elgin returned to England, and Mr. Bruce was appointed his successor. It was at first announced that he had been furnished with ambassadorial powers, but as such powers would have entitled him to demand a personal reception by the emperor, it was, on reconsideration, very judiciously thought better to avoid a question which might lead to great embarrassments, and he was accredited as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Peking court. To our judgment it appears the instructions of Lord Malmesbury were too peremptory as to the course Mr. Bruce was to pursue; and if that course was to be insisted on, most inadequate means were provided.[1] It is but another example of those in the distance imagining they see more clearly than those who are near, and assuming an acquaintance with local circumstances—subject every hour to change—which, without the attributes of omnipresence and omniscience, it is impossible they should possess. Whatever may have been the views of the
- ↑ "Her Majesty's Government are prepared to expect that all the arts at which the Chinese are such adepts will be put in practice to dissuade you from repairing to the capital, even for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty, but it will be your duty firmly, but temperately, to resist any propositions to that effect, and to admit of no excuses. "The Admiral in command of H.M.'s naval forces in China, has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force. "You will insist on your being received at Peking, and will refuse to exchange ratifications at any other place."—Despatch of Lord Malmesbury, 1st March, 1859.
