The French nation has indisputably the most warlike propensities of any in the world. Other countries make warlike preparations in self-defence, for the maintenance of their own rights and possessions, and to prevent any other power, or combination of powers, obtaining a position menacing to their safety, or injurious to their liberties. Their governments, when there are valid grounds for alarm, instil these apprehensions into the minds of the people, who are soon roused to meet the threatened danger. But the unremitting pursuit of the French nation is military glory: no government of that country can exist without ministering to it. France is now armed to the teeth, and ready to do battle for any cause—even "for an idea."
England is the nation which, perhaps sooner than any other, may be called upon to check her in the indulgence of this propensity; and this country also offers more points against which aggressive operations can be carried out. Hence it is natural that the preparations of France should be made chiefly with reference to a contest with Great Britain; and these preparations have now arrived at such formidable proportions that it would be infatuation in us to neglect the means of resistance.
The strongest evidence in support of this hypothesis is to be found in the fact that the most extraordinary preparations which have been gradually but rapidly made by the French Government, at a vast expense—namely, its naval and coast armaments—can be directed against no other power but England. It does not necessarily follow that any aggressive measures are positively contemplated; but it is not the less essential for us to maintain a corresponding force, available not only against invasion, should it be attempted, but strong enough to protect our commerce by securing the freedom of the seas, and thus preventing this country from being reduced to a subordinate power.
British statesmen know and declare, and the nation feels, that it is essential to the maintenance of our possessions, our commerce, and our influence, that we should have a preponderating naval force. Other governments may demur to this, and may even be disposed to dispute the point, as France appears to be now preparing to do. It then becomes a question of national power and resources. This is an unfortunate alternative, but it is one which will not admit of compromise or arbitration: we consider an absolute superiority on the seas essential to the safety of our shores, the prosperity of our commerce, and the security of our colonies; they manifest a determination to contest our maritime supremacy, and to create a force which shall give them even a preponderating influence.
Let us put the case in what may be deemed the legitimate view, repudiating altogether any feeling of national animosity or prejudice. What-
