Page:The Czechoslovak Review, vol3, 1919.djvu/239

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THE CZECHOSLOVAK REVIEW
195

solutely on the Poles, and it was never disappointed. All attempts to create a common Slav front against the Germans were wrecked by Polish aristocracy.

The Magyars were more energetic and brutal in using their influence at court. They held many of the highest places, they adhered to whoever had the real power and they went remorselessly after anything they desired. It was due to them principally that the plans of the dynasty for the conciliation of the Czechs resulted in failure. Even when the war was plainly lost, they refused to consider for a moment autonomy for the Slovaks. And they were thoroughly selfish; when the emperor on several occasions appealed to Magyar magnates and pointed to the favors they had received from the dynasty, they would make no concessions for the sake of the reigning family.

The Czechoslovak question was passed over by the court as insignificant, until our campaign abroad was fully developed and the Entente gained over for us. Up to that time the big people at court were content to have the Czechs looked after by military judges, policemen, spies and such like. Nobody took us seriously; there were to be sure wholesale desertions, and several regiments had to be disbanded, but there was no open rebellion in Bohemia and no one at court saw any reason to be worried about the Czechs. Too late the ruling circles realized that the Bohemian nobility and minister Trnka did not represent the nation, that the masses of the Czech people were firmly lined up in support of the policy of the leaders in Entente countries. Attempts were made to break up Czech ranks by concessions; but as soon as the word was mentioned, Germans and Magyars made an outcry; why, they had fought for Austria and the emperor, while the Czechs were traitors; no concessions to traitors at the expense of patriots. Charles himself was rather sensible about it; he did not blame the Czechs for accepting what the Entente offered them, but against united German-Magyar opposition he was powerless.

William, who got his information from the German foreign office and Germans in Bohemia did not consider the Czech question of much importance. He made no objection to an offer of concessions, but he assured Charles that when Germany defeated Italy and revolution broke out in Lombardy, the Czechs would crawl back to obedience like whipped dogs. But he emphatically opposed granting of self-government to the Czechs, because that would make trouble for him at home.

The court would have liked to conciliate us and its plans very likely would have won over some sheep amongst us. But the Germans and Magyars made any real negotiation with us impossible. Toward the end the sentiment at court was far more hostile toward us; we were blamed both for military defeats ad for the failure of Austrian peace offers. But even then the emperor would have been glad to secure our submission by concessions.

The last reports I received before the overthrow were brief: October 6, 1918: “Negotiations between our man and V. (William) proceed by means of visits and letters. Our man is determined to end it at any cost or abdicate. He is angry, because V. did not keep his promise about accepting all the fourteen points of W. (Wilson). V. could not put it through at home.” October 26, 1918. “Our man wishes to go with his whole family to his country place where he thinks he is best liked. He believes that the war must be ended by Christmas, and something may end it sooner. . . . There is food stored in the castle up to Christmas. . . . The other members are also going away . . . everyone in great fear. . . .


Americanization which the Department of the interior conducts from Washington quite sensibly and with proper appreciation of its complexities has become identified in the minds of some state legislators with Prussian methods of suppressing all that may be inconvenient to the rulers of the state. Thus in Nebraska the legislature made it a crime not merely to have non-English public schools, but to teach children privately, out of school hours and ordinary school buildings, any language but English; and the chair of Bohemian in the University of Nebraska, ably filled for ten years by Prof. Šárka Hrbková, has been abolished on the pretext of insufficient attendance, although other universities are just beginning to introduce courses in Slav languages. In Illinois also an attempt was made to make it impossible for children to learn any language but English, but after the bill passed in the Senate, it was killed in the House, mainly through the efforts of members of the legislature, Joseph Plaček, Joseph Peřina, Edward Smejkal and Joseph Petlák.