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The Danger of Mercenary Parliaments.
1. Several Treatises have been formerly written, and more (I doubt not) will be in this juncture publish'd, with Directions and Informations to the People of England for choosing fit and proper Representatives for the ensuing Parliament, wherein sufficient notice will be taken of the Failures and Defects of several who have already been entrusted in that Service, and the due Qualifications of such who are now to be elected. I shall therefore confine my present thoughts only to one particular Head, which yet, in my opinion, seems to involve in it the inevitable Fate of England, which wholly depends upon the choice of Members for the next Session of Parliament: I mean the choosing or refusing of such Persons who are now possest of any Places and Preferments, depending upon the gift and pleasure of the Court. If herein my Endeavours prove unsuccessful, I shall have nothing left but the satisfaction of my own Conscience to support me under the deplorable Consequents and Effects which must necessarily attend the choice of a House of Commons fill'd with Officers and Court-Pensioners. This is the last struggle and effort the People of England have left them for their Properties; and should we now miscarry in this, we may sit down and idly shew our Affections for our Country, and fruitlesly bewail the loss of our Liberties, but shall never meet with another opportunity of exerting our selves in its Service. That I may therefore set the Minds of People right in this Particular ere it be too late, I think it will be only necessary to shew the danger of choosing Members that are in Places from two Considerations: First, From the nature of such a Parliament consider'd in it self: And, secondly, From what has already been done by Parliaments so qualified. In both which I shall be very brief, and content my self with much fewer Arguments than might be urg'd upon this Subject: For I should almost despair of being surviv'd by the Liberties of England, if I could imagine there was a necessity of saying much in a case not only of such irresistible Evidence and Demonstration, but also of the utmost concern and importance to us.
2. First then, We shall best be able to understand the nature of such an ill-chosen Parliament, by comparing it with a true one, and with the original design of Parliaments in their Institution. I hope it need not be told that they were at first intended for a Support to the King's just Prerogative, and a Protection to the Subjects in their as just Rights and Privileges: For maintaining all due Honour to the Executive Power, and all sutable respect and encouragement to those who are intrusted with the Administration of the Laws: For a poise and balance between the two extreme contending Powers of absolute Monarchy and Anarchy: For a check and curb to insolent and licentious Ministers, and a terror to ambitious and over-grown Statesmen: For giving their Advice to his Majesty in all matters of Importance: For making necessary Laws to preserve or improve our Constitution, and abrogating such as were found burdensom and obsolete: For giving the King Mony for defraying the Charges and Expences of the Government, or maintaining a necessary War against Foreign and Domestick Enemies: For examining and inspecting the Public Accounts, to know if their Mony be applied to its true use and purposes: In short, For the best Security imaginable to his Majesty's Honour and Royal Dignities, and the Subjects Liberties, Estates, and Lives.
3. This being the nature and true design of a Parliament, let us now see whether a House of Commons, full of Officers and Court-Pensioners, will answer those noble and laudable Ends of their Constitution:
