The Defence of Poesie.
tied, not to what should be, but to what is, to the particular truth of things, and not to the general reason of things, that his example draweth no necessarie consequence, and therefore a lesse fruitfull doctrine. Now doth the peerlesse Poet performe both, for whatsoeuer the Philosopher saith should be done, he giues a perfect picture of it by some one, by whō he presupposeth it was done, so as he coupleth the generall notion with the particuler example. A perfect picture I say, for hee yeeldeth to the powers of the minde an image of that whereof the Philosopher bestoweth but a wordish description, which doth neither strike, pearce, nor possesse, the sight of the soule so much, as that other doth. For as in outward things to a man that had neuer seene an Elephant, or a Rinoceros, who should tell him most exquisitely all their shape, cullour, bignesse, and particuler marks, or of a gorgious pallace an Architecture, who declaring the full bewties, might well make the hearer able to repeat as it were by roat all he had heard, yet should neuer satisfie his inward conceit, with being witnesse to it selfe of a true liuely knowledge: but the same mā, assoon as he might see those beasts wel painted, or that house wel in modell, shuld straightwaies grow without need of any description to a iudicial comprehending of them, so no doubt the Philosopher with his learned definitions, be it of vertues or vices, matters of publike policy or priuat gouernment, replenisheth the memorie with many infallible grounds of wisdom, which notwithstanding lie darke before the imaginatiue and iudging power, if they be not illuminated or figured forth by the spea-king
