the sea, capitulation was inevitable. This incident is an excellent example of the power conferred by command of the sea when at the same time there is a sufficient land force judiciously employed.
No other operation of any magnitude was attempted that year, and when the Baltic Squadron returned to England for the winter it was not considered to have put forth its full strength. There was much criticism on the decision not to attack Sveaborg, so a new commander-in-chief, Rear-Admiral the Hon. R. Dundas, with a stronger squadron, was sent up the following year. By this time gunboats and mortar vessels had been prepared, and the crews of the squadron had much improved, so that the new admiral started under fair auspices, Her Majesty Again leading the squadron to sea and wishing it success. In the beginning of August the whole flotilla approached Sveaborg. The gun vessels and mortar boats were to perform the principal part in the bombardment. The fortress consisted of five islands, on which were batteries with numerous heavy guns. On the 9th of August the attack took place. Carefully assigned positions were taken up by our small vessels—the remainder of the fleet being in rear—and a heavy fire opened on the defences. The gun and mortar boats offered so small a mark and were at such a range that the return fire from the shore did comparatively little damage. After some hours our shells blew up more than one magazine and set fire to several buildings. At sunset the gunboats were withdrawn, but the place was
