Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/363

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324
Socrates and Hermogenes.
Cratylus.
Socrates, Hermogenes.is incompetent to decide.

grammar and language—these are his own words — and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters ; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you ; — he means to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of know- ledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides.

There is no correctness in names other than convention, says Hermogenes. Her. I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than con- vention and agreement ; any name which you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old — we fre- quently change the names of our slaves, and the newly- imposed name is as good as the old : for there is no name given to anything by nature ; all is convention and habit of the users ; — such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one else.

Soc. I dare say that you maybe right, Hermogenes: let 385 us see; — Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it ? Her. That is my notion. Soc. Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?

Her. Yes.

Soc. Well, now, let me take an instance ; — suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world ; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world : — that is your meaning?

Her. He would, according to my view.

But how, rejoins Socrates, Soc. But how about truth, then ? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false ?