Charmides.
Socrates, Charmides.
Because, I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have Charmides.
meant one thing, and said another. Is the scribe, for Socrates,
example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or
writes ?
I should rather think that he was doing something.
And does the scribe write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, your own names only, or did you write your enemies' names as well as your own and your friends' ?
As much one as the other.
And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this ?
Certainly not.
Writing is doing; is writing your enemy's name doing your business? And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business?
But they are the same as doing.
And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing anything whatever which is done by art,—these all clearly come under the head of doing?
Certainly.
Must a good citizen make his own coat, etc.? And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a Must a law which compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and strigil, make his 162 and other implements, on this principle of every one doing and performing his own, and abstaining from what is not his own?
I think not, he said.
But, I said, a temperate state will be a well-ordered state.
Of course, he replied.
Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business ; not at least in this way, or doing things of this sort?
Clearly not.
Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning ; for I do not think that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who told you, Charmides?
Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man.
Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as
