Charmides.
Socrates, Critias.
Yes.
\,Vhich is less, if the other is conceived to be greater? To be sure.
And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself, and greater than other great things, hut not greater than those things in comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have the prope11y of being greater aml also less than itself?
That, Socrates, he saii!, is the inevitable inference.
Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other douhles, these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half?
That is true.
And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which is heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be younger: and the same of other things; that which has a nature relative to self will retain also the nature of its object: J mean to say, for example, that hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true?
Yes.
Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice; for there is no other way of hearing.
Certainly.
And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a colour, for sight cannot see that which has no colour.
No.
The relation to self generally incredible and hardly ever certain. Do you remark. Critias, that in several of the examples which have been recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and in other cases hardly credible inadrnissible, for example, in the case of magnitudes, num bers, and the like?
Very true.
But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of self-motion, and the power of heat to burn, this relation to self will be regarded as incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. And some great man, my friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us, whether there is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self, or some things only and not others; and whether in this class of self-related things, if there be such a class, that science which
