Meno.
Socrates, Meno.
'Of course.'
Soc. Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species?
Men. Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order.
But is virtue knowledge? Soc. Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis which is not set aside.
Men. Certainly.
Virtue is a good, and profitable: and all profitable things are either profitable things or the reverse according as they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge. Soc. Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?
Men. True.
Soc. And virtue makes us good?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable?
Men. Yes.
Soc. Then virtue is profitable?
Men. That is the only inference.
Soc. Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth—these, and the like of these, we call profitable?
Men. True.
88Soc. And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you not think so?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like?
Men. Surely.
Soc. And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only