Khelát-i-Ghilzai. Pollock was bidden to retire below the Kháibar as soon as possible, unless he had already begun his march on Kábul, or unless the issue of his negotiations for the release of Akbar's prisoners might be endangered by too hasty a retreat. Whatever Pollock had done or might do, it was still the Governor-General's opinion — wrote Mr. Secretary Maddock — 'that the only safe course is that of withdrawing the army under your command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within the Kháibar Pass, where it may possess easy and certain communications with India.' The brave words uttered on the 15th of March were already forgotten. For many weeks it seemed as if neither the honour of our arms nor the rescue of English captives were worth the risk and trouble of one more campaign[1].
Happily for both these objects Pollock was in no hurry to act upon instructions which he would fain have kept secret alike from friends and foes. Making the most of such discretionary powers as he chose to read into those instructions, he pleaded want of carriage, the claims of the prisoners, the dangers of a hasty retreat, and a due regard for the national honour, as cogent reasons for standing fast, or even for advancing a few marches beyond Jalálálbád. For an advance to Kábul Nott's co-operation would be required; and without some further demonstration of our power that officer would not find it easy to retire from Kandahár. In his letters to Henry Lawrence he regarded an
- ↑ Afghan Papers.
