eign and security policy. The subsequent reforms turned the Russian military around, as shown in the war in Ukraine starting in 2014 and in the large-scale projection of air power to Syria in late 2015.
The war in Ukraine and especially the annexation of Crimea is a transgression without precedent in Europe since the end of World War II. The violation of the fundamental principle of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act that borders can only be changed through negotiations was resented by the EU and the US as political revisionism. The West closed ranks and imposed sanctions on Russia. Russia miscalculated the mood in Ukraine, and misread the reactions in the European Union (not least in Germany) and the United States. In turning to its single largest trading partner, China, Russia also misjudged the pragmatism of Beijing. China’s economy remains deeply involved with the American banking system and cannot circumvent financial sanctions imposed by Washington. The collapse of the oil price coupled with financial sanctions has weakened the Russian economy significantly and increased isolation. Through its air power and special forces in Syria, Russia has re-emerged as a key player in the Middle East and been partly able to break the isolation through direct negotiations with the United States.
In a political and military corollary to the war in Ukraine, Russia stepped up its manoeuvres and resumed flight patrols at levels not seen since the Cold War. Snap exercises and aggressive flight patterns plus suspected incursions of submarines into Swedish waters, combined with unprecedented hostile talk about nuclear weapons, startled the West and especially Russia’s neighbours. Despite the fact that the Russian nuclear doctrine, last updated in December 2015, has not changed in its fundaments since its initial formulation in 1993, provocative talk at high official levels about nuclear weapons and their demonstrative inclusion in major exercises and air patrolling, alerted the Western public. This is enhanced by Russia’s capacity for action and ability to take decisions quickly. It is a policy of ambiguity, even taking pride in a decision-making process as inscrutable and unpredictable as possible. The ability to make strategic decisions quickly and to implement them militarily and politically with great speed and agility sets Russia apart from the tsarist Empire or the USSR.
The strategic challenge for NATO remains its ability to reinforce the defence of the Baltic States. Russia’s strong air defence in vital hubs like Kaliningrad (as also deployed in Crimea) has created a state of affairs characterised by Russia’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Baltic region
