The security and future of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is of vital significance for Finland and Sweden. The Baltic States have experienced unprecedented growth in economic and human contacts over the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea during their twenty-five years of freedom and regained independence, plus subsequent membership of the European Union and NATO. In joining the eurozone, the Baltic States submitted proof of their economic proficiency. It is of strategic significance for Finland and Sweden that the Southern coast of the Gulf of Finland and the Eastern coast of the Baltic Sea remain free.
The war in Ukraine and Russia’s aggressive posture have unsettled the Baltic States. The deeply felt insecurity has stirred the debate in Finland and Sweden, too. NATO membership has not been debated with such seriousness in the two countries since the end of the Cold War. The likelihood that Russia would test NATO Article 5 in the Baltic States remains low, as this would trigger a response from the Alliance. Despite its proven ability to use military force and the prowess of its special operations forces and the capability to project power, Russian resources are stretched. The number of fighting forces remains limited. However, Russia’s new-found strategic and military agility maximises the utility of these forces. As a consequence, NATO has taken a set of measures to reassure its most exposed members and to constrain Russia’s dynamic conduct, which also imposes on Russia’s neighbours a requirement for higher degrees of military readiness. Furthermore, the lack of strategic depth of the Baltic States and the great difficulty in providing timely reinforcements as a result of Kaliningrad’s A2AD capability mean that NATO could be forced to resort to the threat of nuclear escalation in the event of an attack against the Baltic States – as was largely the case for the defence of West Berlin during the Cold War. Such a situation is inherently dangerous.
Russia has also acquired the ability to combine ambiguous or hybrid operations with the use of military means. It is therefore in both Finnish and Swedish interests that the security of the Baltic States is enhanced through adequate military means. In the light of the changed Russian posture and military activity, Sweden is re-building its territorial defence. The Finnish defence posture remains a policy of deterrence by denial. The unprecedented undertaking to jointly deepen Finnish and Swedish defence efforts is another result of the changed military environment.
Russia has fourteen contiguous neighbours and remains the country with the longest land border in the world. Russia’s border with Fin-
