the issue of membership, largely along party lines. Despite Spain’s joining the Atlantic Alliance in 1982, there was widespread disagreement and the implementation of its full participation was put on hold. The matter was put to a referendum in 1986, with 52.5% voting in favour, notwithstanding the backdrop of negative opinion polls. The pace of accession was clearly dictated by the political decision-making process not by technical obstacles. Time was not of the essence.
Finland is in a more exposed location and for legitimate political reasons a hypothetical accession process may be long. The transition period from the current security regime to possible NATO membership would have to be the object of careful diplomatic and political preparation (see section 4 below). The need for advance preparation by Finland with its Western partners in case of accession, notably in terms of handling possible Russian reactions, has been a recurrent theme in many of our meetings.
2. Defence and military implications for NATO
Finland’s possible membership of NATO has strategic and military consequences for NATO as well as for Finland. The effects for NATO will be examined first, since NATO’s response to a possible membership request by Finland will depend to a large extent on these effects. Furthermore, NATO’s ability to fulfil its treaty tasks vis-à-vis Finland as a member is of great potential importance for Finland.
COMMAND STRUCTURE. Unlike the situation during and after the Cold War, NATO’s command structure is no longer principally organised around territorial commands having responsibility for specific geographical areas. Its organisation is built along mainly functional lines, with operations (ACO, Allied Command Operations) in Mons (Belgium) under SACEUR on the one hand, and transformation based in Norfolk (Virginia) under ACT (Allied Command Transformation). Under ACO come land (LANDCOM, in Izmir, Turkey), air (AIRCOM, Ramstein, Germany), and maritime (MARCOM, Northwood, United Kingdom) commands and two joint forces commands (JFC) respectively in Brunssum (the Netherlands) and Naples (Italy). It is at this joint forces level that one can find a broad North-South division. Bringing Finland into this overall command structure should not pose significant difficulties for NATO, whether Finland joins alone or with Sweden as part of NATO’s North-East European theatre of operations.
