Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/51

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wish to become a member of the Alliance. Several of the founding members saw Turkey as a part of the Middle East, possibly entailing diverting resources from the North or Central front. However, strong commitment in the Korean War (with the distinguished participation of a full combat brigade) and NATO’s first SACEUR, General Eisenhower[1], were the two factors behind the decision to let Turkey in. It is interesting to note that the USSR, which had attempted in 1946 to secure rights over the control of the Straits, did not react with any particular vigour vis-à-vis Turkey’s (and Greece’s) entry into NATO.

Apart from its political ramifications, a Finnish application would focus attention on the importance of several geographical areas in Russia, namely St. Petersburg on the one hand, and Murmansk and Arkhangelsk on the other.

The former region has always been sensitive, ever since it was founded in 1703, and has contributed to several wars between first Sweden and then Finland and Russia. Today, the area is Russia’s second major economic engine, the closest major region to the borders of NATO. The distance from the Finnish border to St. Petersburg is less than 200 km.

The other region of Russia where NATO proximity would be seen as particularly sensitive is the Kola Peninsula, still the only home to Russian second strike capabilities in the form of nuclear submarines, with Murmansk located less than 200 km from the Finnish border. While the Murmansk area was no less important during the Cold War, it remains central to Russian claims to nuclear superpower status. Nuclear weapons again play a very visible role in Russian defence strategy and policy. Even if Finland were to follow Norwegian self-imposed restrictions when it comes to stationing nuclear weapons and foreign forces on its territory, Russia could seek to increase its forces in the North to protect the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions and their land communications with the rest of Russia (see Chapter II). As discussed above, this could in turn generate discussions about a NATO presence in Finland, which could collide with unilateral Finnish undertakings of the Norwegian model.

The argument could be made that since Russia has been living with NATO proximity to Murmansk for rather a long time, it could do so also with Finland in the Alliance. But from the Russian standpoint, there may be a dif-


  1. *Before General Eisenhower became a candidate in the November 1952 presidential elections.
THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT | 51