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70 Derek Grossman, et al., China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights: Drivers and Implications, RR2567 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), pp. 13-15, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2567/RAND_RR2567.pdf.
71 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2019, p. 83.
72 “Remote Control: Japan’s Evolving Senkaku’s Strategy,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), CSIS, July 29, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/remote-control-japans-evolving-senkakus-strategy/.
73 “Full Text of Statement of China’s Foreign Ministry on Award of South China Sea Arbitration,” China Daily, July 12, 2016, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016scsi/2016-07/12/content_26062029.htm.
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75 Jeremy Page, Carol E. Lee, and Gordon Lubold, “China’s President Pledges No Militarization in Disputed Islands,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-completes-runway-on-artificial-island-in-south-china-sea-1443184818; and “Chinese Power Projection Capabilities in the South China Sea,” AMTI, CSIS, accessed May 4, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/chinese-power-projection/.
76 Derek Grossman, “Why is China Pressing Indonesia Over its Maritime Claims,” World Press Review, January 16, 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/28476/why-is-china-pressing-indonesia-again-over-the-natuna-islands; Ivy Kwek and Chiew Ping-Hoo, “Malaysia’s Rationale and Response to South China Sea Tensions,” AMTI, CSIS, May 29 2020, https://amti.csis.org/malaysias-rationale-and-response-to-south-china-sea-tensions/; and “Chinese Vessel Rams Vietnamese Fishing Boat in S. China Sea,” Maritime Executive, June 14, 2020, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/report-chinese-vessel-rams-vietnamese-fishing-boat-in-s-china-sea.
77 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mark E. Manyin, “U.S.-North Korea Relations,” CRS Report No. No. IF10246, Congressional Research Service, April 29, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10246/14.
78 Panel of Experts, “Report of the Panel of Experts [to the U.N. Security Council] Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),” S/2020/151, March 2, 2020, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports.
79 For examples, see U.S. Department of State, “Briefing with Special Envoy Lea Gabrielle, Global Engagement Center Update on PRC Efforts to Push Disinformation and Propaganda around COVID,” press release, May 8, 2020, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-special-envoy-lea-gabrielle-global-engagement-center-update-on-prc-efforts-to-push-disinformation-and-propaganda-around-covid/;
