sole and independent owner of the property in his possession, whether self-acquired or ancestral, the author thus proceeds: “A division of it does not take place without the father’s choice; since Munoo, Narudu, Gotumu, Bodhayunu, Sunkhu, and Likhitu, and others (in the following passages, ‘they have not power over it;’ ‘they have not ownership while their father is alive and free from defect;’ ‘while he lives if he desire partition;’ ‘partition of heritage by consent of the father;’ partition of the estate being authorized while the father is living,’ &c.) declare without restriction, that sons have not a right to any part of the estate while the father is living, and that partition awaits his choice: for these texts, declaratory of a want of power and requiring the father’s consent, must relate also to property ancestral, since the same author have not separately propounded a distinct period for the division of an estate inherited from an ancestor.” Ch. II. Sec. 8, (p. 25.) The circumstance of the partition of estates being entirely dependent on the will of the father, and the son’s being precluded from demanding partition while the father is alive, sufficiently prove that they have not any right in the estate during his life time; or else the sons, as having property in the estate jointly with the father, would have been permitted to demand partition. Does not common sense abhor the system of a son’s being empowered to demand a division between himself and his father of the hereditary estate? Would not the birth of a son with this power, be considered in the light of a course rather than a blessing, as subjecting a father to the danger of having his peaceable possession of the property inherited from his own father or other ancestor disturbed?
