Index.
| | Page. | ||
| No. | I.—Introduction,— | 7 | |
| Necessity of a new constitution, | 7 | ||
| Obstacles to be encountered, | 7 | ||
| Inducements to moderation in controversy, | 8 | ||
| General propositions to be discussed, | 9 | ||
| II, III, IV, V.—Concerning dangers from foreign force and fluence,— | 10 | ||
| Inquiry into the importance of union, | 10 | ||
| Characteristics of our country and people, | 11 | ||
| History of the confederation, | 12 | ||
| How and by whom the new constitution was framed, | 12 | ||
| Propriety of candid deliberation as to its provisions, | 13 | ||
| Public safety an important object of government, | 14 | ||
| Union will diminish the causes of war, | 15 | ||
| Union will secure the election of capable men to office, | 15 | ||
| Union will lead to a readier settlement of differences with other nations, | 16 | ||
| Union will strengthen the nation so as not to invite hostility, | 17 | ||
| Dangers arising from conflicting interests of nations considered, | 18 | ||
| Comparison of the facilities for defence by a union, and by separate sovereignties, | 19 | ||
| Results of union illustrated by the history of Great Britain, | 21 | ||
| Danger of dissensions between separate confederacies or states, | 22 | ||
| Impossibility of lasting alliances between states whilst distinct, | 23 | ||
| VI, VII.—Concerning dangers from war between the states,— | 24 | ||
| Frequent contests would arise between the states, if separate, | 24 | ||
| Illustrations from history of other nations, | 24, 25 | ||
| The idea that the genius of republics and the influence of commerce will secure peace, chimerical, | 26 | ||
| Proofs from history, | 27 | ||
| Danger of territorial disputes, | 29 | ||
| Danger of competitions of commerce, | 31 | ||
| Danger of collisions arising from the apportionment of the public debt of the union, | 31 | ||
| Conflicts of laws, | 32 | ||
| Alliances between states, and with foreign nations, | 33 | ||
| VIII.—The effects of internal war in producing standing armies and other institutions unfriendly to liberty,— | 33 | ||
| Nature of the contests which would arise between states, | 34 | ||
| Such contests would result in standing armies and military establishments, | 34 | ||
| Consequent danger from military usurpation, | 36 | ||
| Union the only security against such dangers, | 37 | ||
| IX, X.—The utility of the union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection,— | 38 | ||
| Distractions which agitated the republics of Greece and Italy, | 38 | ||
| Enlargement of the republic a safeguard against such distractions, | 39 | ||
| Views of Montesquieu, | 39, 40 | ||
| Perfect equality of states not essential in a confederacy, | 41 | ||
| Dangers of factions in popular governments, | 42 | ||
| The remedies or preventives discussed, | 43 | ||
