nature—these, our positive and growing possessions, stand in glaring contrast to the failure of the scientific orthodoxy of a former period to fix the outlines of an ultimate creed about the nature of the knowable universe. Why not ‘take the cash and let the credit go’? Why pursue the elusive theoretical ‘unification’ any further, when what we daily get from our sciences is an increasing wealth of detailed information and of practical guidance?
As a fact, however, the known answer of our own age to these very obvious comments is a constant multiplication of new efforts towards large and unifying theories. If theoretical orthodoxy is no longer clearly definable, theoretical construction was never more rife. The history of the doctrine of evolution, even in its most recent phases, when the theoretical uncertainties regarding the ‘factors of evolution’ are most insisted upon, is full of illustrations of this remarkable union of scepticism in critical work with courage regarding the use of the scientific imagination. The history of those controversies regarding theoretical physics, some of whose principal phases M. Poincaré, in his book, sketches with the hand of the master, is another illustration of the consciousness of the time. Men have their freedom of thought in these regions; and they feel the need of making constant and constructive use of this freedom. And the men who most feel this need are by no means in the majority of cases professional metaphysicians—or students who, like myself, have to view all these controversies amongst the scientific theoreticians from without as learners. These large theoretical constructions are due, on the contrary, in a great many cases to special workers, who have been driven to the freedom of philosophy by the oppression of experience, and who have learned in the conflict with special problems the lesson that they now teach in the form of general ideas regarding the philosophical aspects of science.
Why, then, does science actually need general theories, despite the fact that these theories inevitably alter and pass away? What is the service of a philosophy of science, when it is certain that the philosophy of science which is best suited to the needs of one generation must be superseded by the advancing insight of the next generation? Why must that which endlessly grows,
