relieving the Governor institution from its ‘schizophrenic’ duty of representing both Stanley before London and London before Stanley, repeatedly pointed out by Falklands Governors themselves.
It would seem that the actual constitutional framework could be naturally enhanced in several aspects such as:
(1) Having an elected prime minister and cabinet of ministers with ministerial responsibility;
(2) Having native Falklands governors (rather than Foreign Office officials) nominated by the Falklands Prime Minister and appointed by the Queen;
(3) Appropriate arrangements with the UK ensuring that the Foreign Office would act on foreign policy matters related to the Falklands in accordance with prior authorization by the Falklands Government;
(4) Eventually, concluding a comprehensive legal agreement regulating the relationship between the Falklands and the UK, similarly to the way in which the relationship between the USA and the Northern Mariana Islands is regulated by their Compact of Free Association, or the way in which the relationship between the Netherlands in Europe, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba is set out by the Charter of the Kingdom of Netherlands.
Needless to say, both the scope and pace of such evolutional development are up to the Falkland Islanders themselves to set. In particular, the apparent hesitation at this stage of the Falklands political leaders to assume ministerial responsibility would probably leave that reform for another constitutional review. However, democracy necessarily requires the division of powers and separation of executive and legislative branches. Otherwise one sees the Stanley public meetings sort of playing the role of 'parliamentary control', similarly to Parliamentary Questions in the Westminster House of Commons and the House of Lords.
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