Page:The Galaxy, Volume 5.djvu/789

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1868.]
OUR RAILWAY MANAGEMENT.
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of masters, whose power rests, not upon the sword, but upon cunning. Society having neglected to organize its railroad system in its own interests, capital has stepped in and directed it to its own. It is singular that the irresponsible tyranny of capital in this matter, since each of us suffers from it, has not excited more attention, and means been suggested for its removal, particularly since society has an institution which is perfect in its operation, and whose principles could easily be applied to remedy this evil.

This institution is the mint. We have here an industrial organization, which works justly in all its parts. In some way or other society became early convinced that the operation of coining money was too intimately connected with the public interest to be left in the hands of irresponsible individuals, and therefore took the business into its own hands, and forbade any individual in the State, on pain of the severest penalties, from attempting it. The mint may therefore be called a monopoly, but subject to these two balances, one upon each side, which at once necessitate and guarantee the correctness of its workings: if it should make the coinage of a better quality than it ought, its issue would be immediately bought up by the jewellers, or others, and thus pass out of circulation; if, on the other hand, it should debase its issue, it would not circulate except at a discount. The mint also charges enough for the work it does to pay its expenses.

Here then is an industrial enterprise which is self-regulating, self-supporting, and, of necessity, honest and just. Suppose that these qualities could be introduced into every branch of industry and commerce, how desirable such a consummation would be. How different it would be from the present condition of things, every one of us must know from experience. That it would be possible to do so is evident, but would take too long here to comment upon fully. It will be enough now to examine the application of such a system of organization to the railway.

So important an interest should not be left in the hands of irresponsible individuals, against whose selfishness the public interest has no guarantee. The recent disastrous failure of the London, Chatham and Dover Railway, in England, shows how the greed or incompetence of the directors may make a financial failure, with its consequent widespread ruin and distress, out of an industrial enterprise which, if rightly conducted, could not fail to be permanently profitable. This failure, and the general depression of railway stocks in England, produced by the same incompetent management of the directors, who are wholly irresponsible for their misuse of their influence, has excited public attention to the whole question of railways, and produced a discussion in Parliament concerning the expediency of the Government assuming the ownership of all the lines. In Belgium, from the first, this system has been in operation. The Government there owns and operates all the railway and telegraph lines, and to every one's satisfaction. The rates are made low, the officials and employés are capable and courteous, the management is efficient, and any profit made goes toward diminishing the taxes.

Here, too, we see the results of the same system. The Erie Railway, which cost millions of money, and the benefits of which to the people at large are incalculable, is made a mere means for private speculation. From the evidence brought out in the recent trial, it would appear as if even justice itself, as it is theoretically realized in our judicial system, was made a mere aid in the disgraceful squabble between two rival Wall-street cliques, for the sole possession of this mine of plunder. The safety and security of the stockholders, the best interests of the