We have entered into the campaign of General Burgoyne with some minuteness, that we may learn from it a lesson of charity in judging of the conduct of our generals during the late civil war. Seen through the glamour of tradition, our Revolutionary generals on both sides seem to be demigods, whom it has been worse than sacrilege to criticise adversely. If, however, a comparison be instituted between this campaign, conducted by one of the greatest generals of his age, and those undertaken to subdue the Rebellion, it will appear that in all that constitutes military skill and generalship, the advantage, notwithstanding our hasty and harsh criticisms at the time, is greatly in favor of the latter. Nor will this statement lose in force when it is remembered that most of our officers and men in the late conflict consisted of raw and undisciplined militia, whereas those who composed the army of Burgoyne were veteran troops—the flower of the English and German armies—trained in many a hard-fought battle on the plains of Flanders.
The average march of our armies was thirteen miles a day through forests and fallen timber as impenetrable as any that opposed the progress of the English. Burgoyne's average march was three and a half miles a day; more frequently one mile; and it was considered a very respectable feat if he made two miles. Yet we all remember the impatience with which we denounced our own armies for what seemed the slowness of their movements. If we were horror-struck when, after the first battle of Bull Run, the "Quaker guns" deceived the commander-in-chief, several miles off, as to the situation and force of the enemy, what shall be said of a general who, posted so near his opponents' lines as to hear the ordinary noises of a camp, knew absolutely nothing of his strength or position? Nor does the parallel end here. The reader will recall the deep chagrin among, the loyal masses when it was ascertained that everything occurring within our lines was at once known to the enemy, who thus anticipated every movement, while to us all of their plans were as a sealed book. It was then that, in our anguish, we were wont to hold our generals directly responsible for a state of things which, it was claimed, they might easily have prevented, forgetting that precisely the same experience attended Burgoyne during his entire campaign—a circumstance, moreover, rendered additionally surprising from the fact that the army of the British general was composed, in a large measure, of foreigners speaking a strange tongue, whereas the Union and Confederate armies were connected by the closest ties of kindred.
Indeed, a calm, dispassionate review of that which was accomplished in our late civil struggle, tested by the performances of our Revolutionary characters, cannot fail to bring out in strong and favorable relief the exploits of our more recent military heroes.
