142 HUMAN LIBERTY.
treats only in a general and indefinite way. For instance, though nature commands all to contribute to the public peace and prosperity, still whatever belongs to the man- ner and circumstances, and conditions under which such service is to be rendered must be determined b}^ the wisdom of men and not by Nature herself. It is in the constitution of these particular rules of life, suggested by reason and prudence, and put forth by competent authority, that human law, properly so called, consists, binding all citi- zens to work together for the attainment of the common end proposed to the community, and forbidding them to depart from this end; and in so far as human law is in conformity with the dictates of nature, leading to what is good, and deterring from evil.
From this it is manifest that the eternal law of God is~the sole standard and rule of human nberty, not only TiTeach individual man, but also in the community and "civil society which men constitute when united. There- fore, the true liberty of human society does not consist Tn'every man' doing what he pleases, for this would simply end in turmoil and confusion, and bring on the overthrow "of the State; but rather in this, that through the injunc- tions of the civil law all may more easily conform to the prescriptions of the eternal law. Likewise; the liberty of those who are in authority does not consist in the power to lay unreasonable and capricious commands upon then-subjects, which would equally be criminal and would lead to the ruin of the commonwealth; but the binding force of human laws is in this, that they are to be regarded as applications of the eternal law, and in- capable of sanctioning anything which is not contained in the eternal law," as in the principle of all law. Thus St. Augustine most wisely says: "I think that you can see, at the same time, that there is nothing just and lawful in that temporal law, unless what men have gathered trom this eternal law." ^ If, then, by any one in author- • De Libero Arbitrio, lib. i. cap. 6, n. 15.
