her hostility was not without cause; that England, fearing that Russia might become too powerful, endeavoured, at the bidding of her enemies, to prevent Russia's expansion, especially in the direction of Constantinople and of the Far East; that at the time of the Crimean War, not Russia, but England, was apparently in the wrong; that Lord Beaconsfield prevented Russia reaping the fruit of her victory after her last war with Turkey; that, angered by England's attitude and incited by Bismarck and his successors, Russia not unnaturally endeavoured to revenge herself upon this country in the only part where it seemed vulnerable.
The problems of Poland, of Austria-Hungary, and of Asia Minor, which will be very fully considered in other chapters, are perhaps less dangerous to the maintenance of good relations among the Allies than is that of Constantinople. The question of Constantinople has for many decades been considered the most dangerous problem in Europe. Constantinople is supposed to be a point of vital interest not only to Russia, but to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, and this country as well. As the Turks have plunged into the War and have attacked the Allies, they have forfeited England's good will and traditional protection. The settlement of the problem of Constantinople can no longer be shelved. Therefore, it seems best to consider it frankly, dispassionately, and without prejudice.
We have been taught in the past that 'the possession of Constantinople will decide the fate of the world,' that 'Constantinople dominates the world,' and that 'Russia's possession of that position would be fatal to Great Britain's position in India.' In these circumstances it seems necessary not only to consider the character of Russia's foreign policy and of the Russian people, but to study the problem of Constantinople in the light of history and with special reference to Russia's future.
Since the time of Napoleon the question of Constanti-
