Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 01.pdf/356

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Editorial Department.
317


The following is a proposed epitaph on Lord Westbury, called forth by a judgment delivered by him in 1864:—

richard baron westbury.

Lord High Chancellor of England.
He was a distinguished Judge
And an eminent Christian,
And a still more eminent and distinguished
Statesman.
During his tenure of office he abolished the
ancient method of conveying land,
The time-honored institution of the
Insolvency Court,
And the Eternity of Punishment.
Toward the close of his earthly career, in
the Judicial Committee of the House of
Lords, he dismissed Hell with costs,
And took away from orthodox members of
the Church of England, their last hope
of Eternal Damnation.


The value, as an aid to the administration of justice, of the permission to an accused person to testify on his own behalf, has lately been illustrated with remarkable force in a New York trial. William Krulisch, a lad nearly seventeen years old, was on trial charged with the murder of Gunter Wechsung, a clerk in a drug-store. The circumstantial evidence which the Government had procured might have been considered strong enough to convict the boy; and this seems all the more probable as he had no witnesses to call in his defence whose evidence would have been of much use to him, except to corroborate what he had to say. The Government, as it chanced, lost ground through the apparent perjury of a pair of so-called detectives and of a shopkeeper who had sworn that the accused had bought a hatchet which had been the instrument of the murder. But the boy's case looked very black until he had given his testimony, which not the most searching cross-examination could shake, and that testimony was really the means of his acquittal. The poor boy was without money, family (except a brother and sister), or friends, and according to his story had never known father or mother. But he seems to be a straightforward, honest fellow, with no record against him or report that reflects on his character, so far as was shown in the evidence offered. It may be remembered that the first application of the new principle in Massachusetts (at least in a murder case) secured the discharge of the accused, a poor, lone, old Irish woman, charged with the murder of a grandchild, who was also without friends and who could have called no witnesses to save her from punishment. It is interesting also to recall that many lawyers were opposed to this innovation on long-established practice. Perhaps its French origin made it objectionable to them, tradition and custom having impressed upon them the idea that only after England, whence most of our legal principles and practices had come, could one venture on changes. The French, as is well known, go a step farther and compel an accused to testify. We may yet adopt that method.


Nations all over the world are addicted to proverb-making, and the legal profession is of course fathered with a goodly share. In a collection of "Proverbs, Maxims, and Phrases of all Ages," recently published by Robert Christy, an American lawyer, many of these sayings have been chronicled; and though they are somewhat sarcastic, we may say of them, as Mr. Christy truly remarks, that "if the censures are baseless, they are harmless; if well founded, the profession should amend itself." Two German proverbs may be quoted: "The nobleman fleeces the peasant, and the lawyer the nobleman." "'The suit is ended,' said the lawyer; 'neither party has anything left.'" The Danish proverb is certainly biting: "'Virtue is in the middle,' said the Devil when he seated himself between two lawyers;" but the Dutch one is more charitable, "The better lawyer, the worse Christian." There are many younger professions than the law, and it will be interesting to watch what class of proverbs gathers round them; for a proverb has been well said to be "the wit of one man and the wisdom of many."—Montreal Legal News.


We should probably hear less of the law's delays if examples could be made of some of our judges after the manner adopted by Theodoric, King of the Romans. A widow having complained to that monarch that a suit of hers had been in court three years which might have been decided in as many days, the King, being informed who were her judges, gave orders that they should give all ex-