possession, followed by litigation. The present application shows more perseverance and faith in the applicant than discretion or judgment; and presents not a single feature of a case proper for a bill of review. — Grier, J. Purcell v. Minor, 4 Wall. 521. Without great injustice to other interests it is impossible that our whole time shall be given to a single class of questions, and we have not there fore deemed it our duty when we have reached a conclusion with which we are satisfied, upon any given question affecting a class of cases, to answer at length, and expose what we deem a fallacy in every subsequent argument in which counsel may imagine they have successfully demonstrated the inaccuracy of our conclusions. — Per Curiam. Speight v. People, 87 Ill. 599. The Lucille, 19 Wall. 73, furnishes an instance where the court ignored the arguments of both counsel, and decided the case upon a point ap parently not suggested by either. This practice of unlimited assignment is a per version of the rule, defeating all its purposes, bewildering the counsel of the other side, and leav ing the court to gather from a brief, often as pro lix as the assignments of error, which of the latter are really relied on. — Miller, J. Phillips v. Seymour, 91 U. & 648. We do not find it necessary to pursue further an examination in detail of the complicated maze of pleas, demurrers, answers, amendments, and inter locutory orders, which followed the filing of this so-called cross-bill. — Curtis, J. Shield* v. Bar row, 17 How. 146. A congeries of points or prayers of instruction exceeding thirty in number and -covering nearly as many folios, were submitted to the court, some of which were given as prayed for, some with "quali fications," and many refused. If a judge in an swering such a mass of hypothetical and verbose propositions should occasionally contradict him self, or fall into an error; or if the jury, instead of being instructed in law,— should be confused and misled, it may be considered the legitimate result of such a practice. We do not think it necessary, therefore, to examine particularly each one of this labyrinth of propositions, etc. — Grier, J. City of Boston v. Lecraw, do. 432. Notwithstanding the magnitude of the appel lant's paper book, and the earnestness of his coun sel in argument, the case admits of no extended
discussion. . . . The latitude in adducing testi mony before the examiner by the counsel for the plaintiff below is not to be commended, and I cannot doubt that if a little of the consideration bestowed on the argument had been present at the examination, much irrelevant testimony would, as it ought to, have been omitted. — Thompson, J. Leach v. Anspacher, 55 Pa. St. 89. See Mussina v. Cavazos, 6 Wall. 363, where a case on a writ of error to the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, was argued on a motion to dismiss for defect in the writ. The motion was denied. The case was afterward argued elaborately on its merits. The court then discovered that seven tenths of a closely printed record of 522 pages were taken up by a bill of exceptions that had not been signed or sealed by the judge below. In Farnum v. Davidson, 3 Cush. 232, the court wastes no compliments upon either counsel. "The error which runs through the whole case, and seems to have been common to both parties, is in considering evidence as facts." — Per Fletcher, J. The position in which the court is placed in re spect to this cause has been brought about mainly by the officious intermeddling of the counsel for the moving party with the scruples of a judge who, with a proper sense of duty, promptly declined to sit in the cause. — Hurlbut, J. Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 Comstock, 549. Such are some of the criticisms upon the handiwork of individual members of the bar to which their Honors have felt constrained to give expression, and no doubt the circum stances of each case warranted the repri mand. Let it be remembered, however, that they are not the result of a search through the reports, — a task one would scarcely feel inclined to impose upon himself. It is to be remembered too that they are but instances scattered here and there; while the pleasant things in the reports said by judges of coun sel are too numerous to be counted. A counsel gets accustomed to hear the court, while reading an opinion, speak of his argu ment as " able and ingenious," — words of compliment that would be more satisfactory were it not that they so often foreshadow a conclusion that the wise men upon the bench have failed to become convinced by it.
