Court, — whether the amendment did or did not supersede all suits depending, as well as prevent the institution of new suits against any one of the United States by citizens of another State? Tilghman, arguing the negative, said : "The amendment is void. Upon an in spection of the original roll it appears to have never been submitted to the President for his approbation. The Constitution de clares that 'every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disap proved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Repre sentatives.' Now, the Constitution likewise declares that the concurrence of both Houses shall be necessary to a proposition for amend ments. The concurrence of the President is required in matters of infinitely less impor tance; and whether on subjects of ordinary legislation or of constitutional amendments, the, expression is the same, and equally ap plies to the act of both Houses of Congress." There seems to be no escape from the above argument, except through the con struction of the words " resolution, or vote." Of course it is improbable that there was any intention that the President could veto an amendment, but Justice Chase dismissed Tilghman's objection too briefly in not allow ing any discussion upon it. See the note on page 381. Mr. Tilghman became a judge first in John Adams's United States Circuit Court, and then President of the Common Pleas, July 1, 1805. Within a year from that, Governor McKean selected him to be Chief-Justice. It is said that for more than ten years he de livered an opinion in every case but five, ill ness preventing his hearing four of these, and a death in the family the remaining one. He was not a vigorous man; being of delicate make, the voice and eye somewhat mild,
and with much gentleness of bearing. In the opinions of McKean and of Gibson is found a strong flavor of the individuals that wrote them. The infused personality over bears the abstract qualities, till often through the law that is undoubtedly there you see the man plainer than the principle he is an nouncing. But Tilghman's writing is of that highly impersonal, clear, and colorless sort apt to come from an organism more intellect ual than animal. His sentences seem like the inevitable spinning of a well ordered machine. Such an absence of the personal equation will give results more secure, if less picturesque, than if they bore the taint of paradox that has been found by some in Gibson's work. As these cases are of tech nical rather than of historic interest, in stances shall be no more than referred to in this place. The following may all be found in 3 Binney, and some are good illustrations of peculiar Pennsylvania law, and all of the Chief-Justice's simple and yet thorough manner of demonstrating the pertinent legal propositions of a case. Murray v. Wil liamson, 135. The equitable owner of a chose in action, though unable to sue in his own name, may set it off against the obligor who brings covenant upon an indenture of lease to recover rent in arrear. Lessee of Findiay v. Riddle. The rule in Shelley's Case does not apply where a devise was " to my son A . . . during his natural life . . . and after his decease, if he shall die leaving lawful issue . . . to his heirs as tenants in common, and their respective heirs . . . forever. But in case A shall die without leaving lawful issue . . . to my son B. . . . his heirs . . . for ever." Judge Tilghman takes less than a single page to make this clear; Judge Yeates occupies from pages 148 to 161 to explain the same thing in an appeal from the ChiefJustice's decision. Lessee of German v. Babbald, 304. Parol evidence may be given to establish a trust which arises by implica tion of law. Wells v. Tucker, 366. A dona tio mortis causa to the wife for another's use is good.
