opposition. " His great fairness and unyield ing integrity and natural fitness," said Sen ator James Noble, " won the respect and hearty good-will of us all, and we could n't find it in our hearts to oppose him." Ten months later he was appointed Judge of the Supreme Court. At this time he was five feet nine inches in height, erect and very straight, delicately and slenderly shaped, cleanly shaven, and had a bright and genial countenance, and possessed exceedingly kind and conciliatory manners. He was exceed ingly diffident, which increased with advanc ing years. It was said of him that " he looked too young for that high judicial station." It was at the funeral of his predecessor that Governor Jennings informed him of his intention to appoint him to the vacant judge ship. As was usual on such occasions, Black ford lost his voice and could not speak; but somewhat regaining his composure, he be sought the Governor not to carry out his in tentions, urging his want of years, lack of experience, his limited knowledge, and the superiority of other men, half-a-dozen of whom he named. But the Governor re fused to accept his advice. In mental calibre he was not the first in rank, even among the young men of his day; and he never was deemed a great law yer and a profound jurist. In breadth of mind or mental vigor, Dewey was far his su perior. Blackford was a man of precedent. "The principal characteristic of his mind," said an eminent lawyer, " is caution. He never guesses. He is emphatically a book judge. Declarations with him are nothing : precedent and good authority, everything." Blackford had a horror of being wrong, and an earnest desire to be right. His timidity and eagerness made him the slave of prece dent, and to hesitate to act independently. Yet he possessed a concentration of legal acumen that enabled him absolutely to ex haust any question of law. Of him it has been said, as a judge of the Supreme Court of Michigan said to the writer of Judge Christiancy of that court, " that when he had
given his opinion, his associates knew that he had exhausted the subject." Blackford's reverence for judicial dicta sometimes led him into error. Thus, in The State v. Tipton (i Blackf. 166) he wrote an opinion to the effect that the judg ment of a court of competent jurisdiction respecting contempts could not be appealed from, relying upon the Case of the Lord Mayor of London (3 Wils. 188). For more than forty years this was the law of the State, until the question again passed un der view, when it was found that the Eng lish case was not at all in point, while the whole current of modern decisions was the other way. In the cases of Deming v. Bullitt (1 Blackf. 241) and Cunningham v. Flinn (1 Blackf. 266), he held that a demand made before bringing the action for a deed, where the owner of land had covenanted to convey as payment of the purchase-money and the money had been paid, in order to maintain an action for a specific performance, was not necessary. A few years later, the q'lestion arose in Sheets v. Andrews (2 Blackf. 274), after Sugden's work on " The Law of Ven dors and Purchasers of Estates " had ap peared; and on the strength of the state ment of that eminent authority, Blackford overruled his two former opinions, holding that a demand first made was essential to maintaining the action. So in the case of Shanklin v. Cooper (8 Blackf. 41) is another illustration of his reverence of precedent. Twenty thousand dollars was involved. One French had executed two notes in New York, made payable in a bank in that State, in favor of Shanklin, who, in Indiana, indorsed them to Cooper. If the contract of indorse ment was an Indiana contract, Shanklin was not liable under the facts developed at the trial; if it was a New York contract, he was liable. Judge Sullivan wrote an opinion holding the indorsement to be an Indiana contract, but before he filed it his term of office expired. The case was then assigned to Blackford, who found that in Rothschild
