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nominated a complete State ticket. Judge Snodgrass took an active part in the heated canvass following, making a reputation as an effective stump-speaker. In 1882 he took a prominent part in the negotiations that led to the reconciliation of the two wings of the party, and the adoption of a platform proposing a settlement of the State debt satisfactory alike to the people and to the bond-holders which was finally effected. During that year he removed to Chattanooga, where he has since resided. In 1883 he was made a member of the Commission of Referees for West Tennessee. By the choice of the other two members of the Commission, he presided over its sessions. His two years' service on that tribunal brought to him such reputation as a judge that when he offered himself as a candidate for Supreme Judge in 1886, he procured the vote of his own county, Hamilton, over Judge Cooke, also a candidate from that county; and he was nominated on the second ballot after a close contest. The almost solid support given him by the lawyers of West Tennessee did much to turn the scale in his favor.

When Judge Snodgrass entered on the discharge of his duties as Supreme Judge, he was barely five months past the constitutional age (thirty-five), being the only man who has ever reached the bench at that age, with the exception of Judge Turley. There had been bitter opposition to his nomination because of the active part he had taken in the late acrimonious political

contests. The delegates from upper East Tennessee had contended that he had been a resident of the division too short a time to entitle him to be put on the ticket as the only judge from East Tennessee, and fought his nomination vigorously. For these reasons there was some dissatisfaction with his nomination. But the first term at which he served dissipated entirely this dissatisfaction, and made some of his stoutest opponents his warmest friends and admirers.

The constitution of Judge Snodgrass is such that it fits him for an unlimited amount of work. He is a man of unusual quickness of apprehension, his mind acting with a rapidity that is almost lightning-like. This capacity for work, united with quickness of apprehension, especially qualified him to take part in the cleaning up of the crowded docket of the court. These qualities, added to a retentive memory, make him most valuable in consultation, where his influence is most decided. His written opinions are ordinarily not elaborate, but they evince the thorough grasp that his mind has of the case. He is peculiarly felicitous in phrasing them, and they are fine examples of the best judicial writing. His vigorous mentality leads him to often dissent from the opinion of the majority. He is particularly a persistent opponent of those doctrines that confer special privileges or rights on favored classes. One of his best opinions is that of Case v. Joyce, 89 Tenn. 337, denying the right of homestead in land held in com-