observed. The more helpless she becomes, the greater his duty to love and protect her. The wife has never abandoned the husband, but is now confined in the asylum for lunatics by his consent and direction."
It must be noted that the husband offered to bind his estate for the proper support of his wife. A DEFINITION. — In Nix i.. Hedden, 13 Supreme Court Reporter, 881, it was held that tomatoes are "vegetables," rather than "fruits," in the common and popular acceptation of such words, and were not free of duty under the provision of the free list for "fruits, green, ripe, or dried." Mr. Justice Gray observed : — "There being no evidence that the words 'fruit' and 'vegetables ' have acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce, they must receive their ordinary meaning. Of that meaning the court is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all words in our own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are admitted, not as evi dence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37, 42; Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 216; Nelson v. Cushing, 2 Cush. 519, 532, 533; Page v. Fawcet, i Leon. 242; Tayl. Ev (8th ed ) §§ 16, 21. Botanically speaking, toma toes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables which are grown in kitchen gardens, and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery, and lettuce, usually served at dinner in, with, or after the soup, fish, or meats which constitute the principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert. "The attempt to class tomatoes as fruit is not unlike a recent attempt to class beans as seeds, of which Mr. Jus tice Bradley, speaking for this court, said ' We do not see why they should be classified as seeds, any more than walnuts should be so classified. Both are seeds, in the language of botany or natural history, but not in commerce nor in common parlance. Oil the other hand, in speaking generally of provisions, beans may well be included under the term vegetables. As an article of food on our tables, whether baked or boiled, or forming the basis of soup, they are used as a vegetable, as well when ripe as when green. This is the principal use to which they are put. Beyond the common knowledge which we have on this subject, very little evidence is necessary, or can be pro duced.' Robertson p. Salomon, 130 U. S. 412, 414."
TWICE ш JEOPARDY. — In Cleary v. Booth, Q. B. Div., 68 Law Times Rep. N. s. 349. it was held that the head master of a board school has power to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil belonging to the school, for an offence committed by the pupil when on the way to the school and out of school hours. Lawrence, J., said : —
"The cases cited shew what is to be done by the master with the pupils when they are in school and away from home, but there is nothing to show what is to be done when they are between their homes and their school and misconduct themselves. I am of opinion that in such cases the power of the father, as was exercised by the appellant in this case, is delegated to the schoolmaster. The Regu lations of the Education Department of 1892 contain a clause allowing a grant for discipline and organization, and it is also provided in that clause that care should be taken in the management of a school to bring up the children in habits of punctuality, good manners, and language, and also to impress upon the children the importance of obe dience, respect for others, and of honor and truthfulness. It could not therefore be said, if the schoolmaster was only allowed to punish for acts done in the school, that he had done everything to insure that end. Should a boy misbehave himself immediately after leaving the school premises, I am clearly of opinion that in such a case the schoolmaster would have authority to punish the boy so misconducting himself. It would not be reasonable, I think, to hold that the parent's authority ended at the door of his own house, and that the schoolmaster's au thority did not begin until the schoolhouse was reached." Collins, J., said: " It is clear law that the father has the right to reasonably punish his children. From classic times we have the practice of inflicting corporal punish ment by the parent. The question now before us is, How far are we to infer that this right is delegated to the school master by the parent or guardian? Does the parent dele gate his power beyond certain limits? The bringing up and discipline must, to some extent, extend to children when outside the school as well as when inside the school. The parent's authority could never be worked if it is to extend up to the school door, and the schoolmaster's authority were to end when the child leaves the school. Supposing a pupil were to hit the master outside the school, the only remedy the master would then have would be a prosecution for assault against the pupil. Can the moral training and conduct of children be said to only exist in school and during school hours? The Regula tions issued by the Education Department say that all reasonable care is to be taken in the ordinary management of the school, to bring up the children in habits of punctu ality, of good manners, &c., of consideration and respect for others, &c. Here it is said to be reported to the schoolmaster that a boy, instead of consideration and respect for another boy, had hit that other boy and injured him. I think that we are entirely justified in interpreting that the parent had delegated his authority, and that the corporal punishment inflicted by the schoolmaster was entirely within the master's delegated authority. Whether the punishment so inflicted was more than was reasonable was a question for the magistrates."
This holding is precisely like that in Hutton v. State, 23 Tex. Ct. App. 386; 59 Am. Rep. 776; and Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485; 55 Am. Rep 387; Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa, 567; Lauder v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114; Sherman v. Inhab. of Charlestown, 8 Cush. 160.
