The Lawyers Easy Chair. $865.15 to Colonel A. S. Berry. That bill is for 'dry' and wet provisions ordered by Hallam, and disposed of by Hallain's supporters. Such generosity on the part of the victor to the vanquished is truly touching."
There was a verdict of $2,500, and this was sus tained. The court said, among other things: — "But it was contended for the defendant that the privi lege covers not only comments, but also statements of fact, and that the American rule is, by reason of the dif ference in government and institution, broader than the English rule. The English rule, as stated by Cockburn, C. J., in Seymour v. Butterworth, 3 Fost. & F. 377, is that if a writer asserts that a member of Parliament had bar gained to sell his vote upon a corrupt contract, or that a member would not have voted or spoken as he did but for a corrupt understanding that he should receive a reward, such would not be excusable as fair comment. See, also, Davis r. Shepstone, L. R. u App. Cas. 187, where Herschell, L C., notes the distinction between comment or criticism and allegations of fact, and limits the privilege to the comment or criticism. See also Ogden Sland. & L. 33 et iff., under the title ' Criticism.' The American rule, according to the weight of authority, is substantially the same. In Smith :: Tribune Co., 4 Biss. 477, the rule is stated to be that a public journal has no right to make specific charges against a public man unless they are actually true, and mere honesty of motive is not a sufficient defence. Judge Drummond said that if the rule were otherwise, every public man would be at the mercy of every journalist, and they could launch charges against him with impunity. So it has been held that the privilege of fairly canvassing the acts or conduct of public men does not include or imply a license to vilify or defame them. Snyder -•. Fulton, 34 Md. 128; Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 2II. The Supreme Court of Massa chusetts in Curtis Z'. Mussey, 6 Cray, 273, held that pub lished charges against a public officer of corrupt and improper motives were not privileged, and that without a plea of justification there was no complete defence, and legal bar to the action. In Hamilton v. Eno, Si N. Y126, Chief Justice Folger, announcing the opinion of the court, said that the truth concerning a public officer might be published in good faith, but for what was false and aspersive the publisher was liable, however good his motives. In Seely v. Blair (decided in 1833), Wright (Ohio), 358,683, — one of the early cases, — the Supreme Court of Ohio held that nobody has a right to slander, or utter falsehoods of, a public officer, or of a candidate for office; and in Publishing Co. v. Moloney (decided Janu ary 31, 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 921, the same court said that the defence of privilege must be pleaded (which has not been done in this case), and, recognizing the right of free and full comment and criticism on the official conduct of a public officer, denied the doctrine that the press is privileged to speak as freely of the private character of the person holding the office as of his official conduct and character. The court says: 'In our opinion a person who enters upon a public office, or becomes a candidate for one, no more surrenders to the public his private character than he does his private property.' The defend ant in the case now before this court was the plaintiff in 55
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error in that case, represented by the same counsel, who apparently argued the same points, and presented the same authorities, as here. The court cited with approval Seely v. Blair, mpra, and held that ' while it is the right of the press, as it is of individuals, to freely criticise and comment upon the official action and conduct of a public officer, false and defamatory words spoken or published of him, as an individual, are not privileged on the ground that they related to a matter of public interest, and were spoken or published in good faith.'"
NEGLIGENCE EXCUSED IN THE HUNGRY. — The law is tender toward nursing infants and railway passengers in search of wayside meals. Thus in Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Shean, 33 Рас. Rep. 108, it was held, that where a train stops at an eatingstation, and there is a track between the train and the station, a passenger alighting from the train has the right to assume that the railroad company will so regulate its trains that its tracks between the car and the eating-station platform will be safe for him to pass over in going to and returning from the eatinghouse, and his failure to look and listen for an approaching train is not negligence. The court said : "The same duty, we think, is imposed upon the com pany towards a passenger while, on a continuous journey, he is going to and returning from the eating stations pro vided by the company for the accommodation of passen gers. While leaving the train for this purpose he docs not cease to be a passenger, or lose the protection of those regulations that the company is bound to provide for his safety while on its cars, or when rightfully upon its depot grounds. The same rules of law can be invoked for his protection under such circumstances as are afforded to passengers going to and from its cars. Their duty in . the latter respect is well settled." Citing Railroad Co. r. White, 88 Pa. St. 333; Terry v. Jewett, 78 N. V. 338; Brassell v. Railroad Co., 84 N. Y. 241; Archer v Rail road Co., 106 N. Y. 589; Jewett r< Klein, 27 N. J. Eq. 550; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, 60 Md. 449 " By the foregoing and other well-considered cases it is settled that a passenger on a railroad, while passing from the cars to the depot, is not required to exercise that degree of care in crossing a railroad track as is imposed upon other persons, and that he has the right to assume that the company will discharge its duty in making the way safe; and, relying on this assumption, may neglect pre cautions that are ordinarily imposed upon a person not holding that relation; and this distinction is to be taken into consideration in determining the propriety of his conduct. Under all the facts shown in evidence and the circumstances surrounding the accident, whether the per son injured was guilty of contributory negligence at the time is a question within the province of the jury to decide, and one that the court cannot rightfully take from them."
A DEFINITION. — The Federal judges, in passing upon questions of customs duties, have created quite a dictionary from first to last. Just now it is de
