an ineffaceable and permanent impression. witness for the prosecution was called, he What though they were told by the court did not respond, and the district-attorney that ' the fact that the defendant committed said, " Perhaps some one has got hold of one crime was no evidence that he committed him." Being rebuked by the trial court, he this'? This language of the court came very said, " I will prove it before I get through." near sanctioning the charge made by the dis The appellate court said of this: "He did trict attorney, or taking it as true. It was not thereafter even offer to prove this charge. enough that the defendant came before the He evidently made this unfounded charge jury for trial for this crime, already guilty to prejudice the defendant's case in the minds of several other crimes, by the solemn and of the jury. This may not of itself be such deliberate statement of this high and impar an error as to warrant a reversal of the tial officer of the State and of the court. It judgment, but it was grossly improper, and was impossible that he should have a per very unfair towards the prisoner, and was fectly fair and impartial trial after this. I wickedly consistent with his preceding un never heard of such an opening speech from warrantable and reprehensible assault upon a prosecuting officer before, and I question the defendant's previous character." But if there ever was one so violent and repre after this scoring we do not find any intima hensible. Now that this case is before this tion that the district-attorney resigned his court on this alleged error, to sanction it office! would overrule every previous case decided In Pence v. State, 11o Ind. 95, the court by this court in which such an error was said : " During his closing argument to the assigned, and be in conflict with all of the jury, the prosecuting attorney referred to decisions of other courts upon this question. the riots in Cincinnati, and the burning The remarks of counsel to the jury upon of the court-house by a mob, which had matters outside of the evidence in Bremmer occurred recently before the trial. He v. Railway Co., 61 Wis. 114, which were assigned as a cause for the mob-violence, deemed in that civil case sufficient error to the lax administration of the criminal law reverse the judgment, were a thousand times in that city. The appellant objected to the more harmless. In Brown v. Swineford, 44 reference thus made, and the conclusions drawn. The court overruled the objection. Wis. 282, the remarks were far less objec tionable, and they were held of sufficient The remarks alluded to above had reference to an historical event, concerning which the consequence to reverse an otherwise merito rious judgment. Chief-Justice Ryan said in jury were supposed to be familiar, both in that case: ' It is sufficient that the extra-pro respect to its occurrence, and the causes to fessional statements of counsel may gravely which it was attributed. As there was no prejudice the jury, and affect the verdict,' allusion made to the defendant in that con citing Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317; nection, or to his being in any manner con State v. Smith, 75 N. C. 306; Ferguson v. cerned in the riots, we cannot say that the State, 49 Ind. 33. A great many similar privilege of fair debate was transgressed. "In his closing argument, counsel for cases are cited in the brief of the appellant's counsel in that case, and in the brief of the defendant, by way of illustrating the value learned counsel for the plaintiff in error in of certain testimony given on behalf of the this case, to which reference may be liad. State to sustain the general reputation of a For these very objectionable remarks of the witness, said, in substance, that the witnesses district attorney, so approved by the court, did not profess to have any knowledge of the we are compelled to reverse the judgment reputation of the witness whose testimony of conviction in this case, and order a new they were called to sustain, and that from trial." In the same case, when the first the same standpoint he could personally
