Charles O'Conor. slaves brought into a free state simply for the purpose of passing through to another destination. Mr. O'Conor is not blamable for advocating Mrs. Lcmmon's claim on statutory and constitutional grounds, but he improved the occasion to declare and elab orate his belief that the institution of negro slavery was "just, benign, and benef1cent," and to use language, in the support of this unnecessary claim, unparalleled in any court of justice in a free state, to my knowledge, and that very unpleasantly affected the mass of Northern people at that critical period. He started off in his points with the argu ment that the negro is essentially, and must always remain, an inferior being unfit to "sustain a civilized social state," and there fore it was right to enslave him. He ro bustly declared, " That alone and unaided he can never sustain a civilized social organ ization is proven to all reasonable minds by the fact that one single member of his race has never attained proficiency in any art or science requiring the employment of high intellectual capacity. A mediocrity below the standard of qualification for the impor tant duties of government, for guiding the affairs of society, or for progress in the abstract sciences, may be common in indi viduals of other races; but it is universal among negroes. Not one single negro has ever risen above it." As to the constitu tional obligations he observed, " Portia's mode of keeping promises (Merchant of Venice, act 4, scene 1) is allowable only in respect to facts having the form of contracts, but which are of no binding force or obliga tion in law or morals. The American citi zen, who, applying Shakespeare's doctrine, carries in his bosom a chapel illuminated by the higher law, and devoted to those infernal deities, Evasion and Circumvention, may be justified if the constitutional compact be void; but if it be valid, he violates honor and conscience." In his opening argument at the outset he challenged his opponents to point out any line of the Holy Scriptures
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which pronounces or implies that human slavery is wrong. From this carefully pre pared masterpiece of rhetoric and mis directed ingenuity I extract the following choice passages. After some sarcasm on " Louis Napoleon," who sought to " disturb " Mrs. Lemmon's "domestic relations," and " invade " her "domestic peace," he observed, among other things : — "What is there in our judicial history, what is there in our common law, as it is called, or in the sources of our law, to entitle a court of jus tice, at this day, of its own authority, and irre spective of obedience to the mandates of positive legislation, to pronounce negro slavery unjust, or contrary to the fundamental principles of our in stitutions? What is there to warrant any court of justice in this state, or in any state of the Union, to pronounce such a sentence as that, pre liminarily to an inquiry into the import of the few simple words of plain English contained in this statute? I maintain that there is nothing to war rant it. Still it is manifest that there is no prin ciple in the English common law which inhibits slavery as immoral or unjust, as repugnant to nat ural right or divine law. In the earliest stages of our existence as a people . . . negro slavery was recognized as just and lawful in this colony. Ne groes were held in bondage without a doubt or a scruple as to its justice or morality. . . It will be seen therefore that in its origin our law did not receive from any quarter as one of its ele ments any principle repugnant to slavery as a civil institution. We received none from divine authority; we imported from England no pro hibition of slavery, and the moment we began to make laws, and to lay the foundation of our social order, we established for ourselves a use ful civil institution, the status of negro slavery." Of Lord Mansfield's celebrated utterance in the Somerset case, he remarked : — "Certainly so much of it as was law had but little significance, while so much of it as was poetry has had considerable effect; it has won for him much unmerited applause. . . We have as authority for our position that it is not evil per se, the voice of all mankind in past ages, and of all portions of mankind amongst whom law is
